852 { Notes to pages 736–750
- Two works exemplify this Indian realist critique: Arun Shourie, Are We Deceiving
Ourselves Again? Lessons the Chinese Taught Pandit Nehru but Which We Still Refuse to
Learn, New Delhi: SAA Publications, 2008. Shourie is one of India’s prominent public
intellectuals. Jaswant Singh, Defending India, London: Macmillan, 1999. Singh was a key
leader in the BJP government led by A. B. Vajpayee that took power in 1998 and conducted
the nuclear bomb tests. This book was essentially the manifesto on which the BJP took
power in 1998 and set Indian policies in a new direction. - Quoted in Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 229–30.
- Regarding US-Pakistani maneuvering over Pakistan’s nuclear program and the
Khan ring, see Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United
States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, New York: Walker, 2007. - Regarding China’s 1975 decision, see page 334. Regarding the 1982 decision, see
page 449. - John W. Garver, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations,” India Review,
vol. 1, no. 4 (October 2007), pp. 1–30. - John W. Garver, “The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia,” Orbis, Summer
2012, pp. 391–411. - This is the central thesis of Protracted Contest.
- The Military Balance 2013, chap. 6, , London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014, p. 260.
- John W. Garver, “The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the
Post-Cold War Era, NBR Analysis, vol. 13, no. 5 (October 2002). Hereafter cited as
“Triangle.” - The statement is available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/docs/210a.htm.
- Garver, “Triangle,” p. 17.
- Garver, “Triangle,” p. 18.
- Strategic Survey, 1996, London: IISS, 1996, pp. 202–3.
- Quoted in Garver, “Triangle,” p. 19.
- Quoted in Garver, “The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India’s
Nuclear Tests,” China Quarterly, no. 168 (2001), p. 868. - Ibid.
- This follows, Garver, “Restoration of Comity,” pp. 870–5.
- See Garver, “Triangle,” p. 26.
- Regarding this US process of recalculation, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging
India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2004. - Regarding Sikkim’s status, see Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 171–2.
- Zhongguo waijiao, 2002 (China’s diplomacy, 2002), Beijing: MFA, 2002, p. 105.
- Quoted in John Garver and Fei-ling Wang, “China’s Anti-encirclement Struggle,”
Asian Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (2010), p. 242. - The quest for economic growth and the increasing political influence of
Indian-Americans in the US were also important factors driving the new relationship. - Quoted in Garver, “Triangle,” p. 39.
- Quoted in Garver and Wang, “Anti-encirclement Struggle,” p. 244.
- Quoted in Garver and Wang, “Anti-encirclement Struggle,” p. 247.
- This and many other articles in China’s war-scare effort of 2005–2009 are dis-
cussed in Garver and Wang, “China’s Anti-encirclement Struggle,” pp. 249–51. - Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 86–108.