78 { China’s Quest
in Korea.^41 Based on the CCP’s own military experience up to 1950, reinforced
by classic Chinese military thought that stressed tactical deception and cun-
ning, and romantically certain of the revolutionary zeal of China’s masses,
Mao genuinely imagined that China’s vastly undergunned forces could sweep
American forces out of Korea. Mao also had an ideologically biased image of
the morale and fighting capacity of US forces. This led, according to Zhang, to
Chinese soldiers dying in vast numbers for objectives which were realistically
beyond their capacity. According to Zhang and based on official Chinese
accounts, 148,000 Chinese soldiers died in Korea, compared to 33,629 US
soldiers.^42Ending the Korean WarFour successive waves of CPV offensives between October 1950 and March
1951 imposed very heavy causalities on Chinese forces. Peng Dehuai had pro-
posed a fifth major offensive for April, with new Chinese divisions being sent
in to replace units that had already suffered heavy casualties. Mao approved
the proposal. The offensive was duly launched, only to fail with very high
Chinese casualties.^43 Mao concluded that a lull in fighting via initiation of
peace talks would provide a period in which CPV front lines could be rein-
forced, resupplied, and better linked via communications, preparing them to
resume further offensive pushes.^44 Beijing had rejected a January 1951 United
Nations proposal for a ceasefire because, as Zhou Enlai explained, it would
only allow US/UN forces to regroup and reinforce. After the exhaustion of
the CPV’s fifth offensive, a ceasefire would favor China by allowing reor-
ganization of CPV forces, Mao concluded. Talks began on July 10, 1951. They
would continue for two years, until July 27, 1953.
Mao and Zhou also believed that negotiations could be exploited to polit-
ical advantage. Contradictions between the United States and its European
allies could be exploited. Mao and Zhou also believed that China and North
Korea were better able to bear a protracted war than was the United States.
The basis for this belief is not clear; probably it was due to the differing struc-
tures of power and authority in Leninist and liberal democratic systems.
There would be no antiwar movements or protests in the PRC or North Korea.
In any case, throughout the negotiations, Mao, Zhou, and Stalin exchanged
affirmations of the belief that the United States was more afraid of protrac-
tion of the war than were China and North Korea. Of course, protraction
had to be made costly for the Americans by continuing to impose battles and
casualties on the United States. Fighting was integral to the Chinese process
of negotiation, “talking while fighting” (yi bian tan, yi bian da).
Beijing’s bedrock belief that the United States feared war protraction more
than China did is not born out by the negotiation record. In those talks, the