THE END OF THE HOUSE OF BARCELONAof approval from Martin, notably his nomination as royal
lieutenant; but he damaged his reputation, perhaps irretriev-
ably, when he was implicated in the murder of the archbishop
of Saragossa, who was known to oppose his candidature.
The danger was that the federation itself would disintegrate,
though there were influential forces, such as Pope Benedict
XIII, who were pulling vigorously the other way. The real vic-
tory was in creating a panel of nine electors drawn from the
three major states, Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia, contain-
ing a combination of churchmen (in the majority) and emi-
nent lawyers; and in June 1412, at Caspe, the nine declared
that after long study they had determined Ferdinand of
Antequera to possess the best claim, as Martin's closest rel-
ative. This was a somewhat surprising argument, because,
whatever Ferdinand's virtues, there were others, including
even the king of Castile, who might have better been able to
press a claim based on closeness of blood ties. On the other
hand, it is difficult not to be impressed by the way that the
federation survived two years of interregnum, during which
Carts met, administrators soldiered on, and even the far flung
territories overseas were not after all lost, though there were
strong moves in Sicily, predictably enough, to re-establish
an independent monarchy. Open civil war did not break
out, even though battle was joined between the parties of
Ferdinand and James at Murviedro, in January 1412, with
Ferdinand's men gaining the upper hand. But the battle did
not decide the issue. That is crucial. It was the electors at
Caspe, the well-named 'Compromise of Caspe', who deter-
mined the outcome.^20 It was a step into the unknown, cer-
tainly resented by some contemporary commentators, for
Aragon-Catalonia to link itself so decisively to the Castilian
royal family, and to a Castilian prince who spoke no Catalan
but who retained vast tracts ofland in Castile. Perhaps indeed
the electors had the vision to see that this could mean not
the domination of Aragon by Castile, but the domination of
Castile by Aragon, so long as Aragon had effective rulers
with decisive policies.
- S. Sobreques i Vidal, El Compromis de Casp i la noblesa catalana (Bar-
celona, 1973; originally published in article form in the Anuario de
Estudios medievales, 7, 1970-71); F. Soldevila, El Compromis de Casp
(3rd edn, Barcelona, 1994).