442 Chapter XVIII
extremism would have been. The king was obliged to humble himself. He was re-
quired to endorse the commonplaces of the European counter- revolution—to
confess that he had been “seduced by new and bold maxims,” that he now under-
stood that “only the government as established by our ancestors can eternize the
duration and glory of Poland,” and to agree upon the “terrible disasters” that en-
sued “whenever a nation, instead of correcting the defects of its former govern-
ment, endeavors totally to overthrow it.”^28
With the Russians occupying most of the country and the Targowica party
coming into control, the governments of Austria and Prussia in the summer of
1792 each signed an agreement with the Russian Empress, committing themselves
to uphold the former constitution of Poland, as arranged in 1773 after the First
Partition. Thus the new order in Poland was suppressed and the focus of revolu-
tionary agitation in Eastern Europe brought presumably under control. It is con-
ceivable that Catherine II might have been satisfied with a plan that left Poland
undividedly under her own influence. But both Prussia and Austria now had rea-
son to urge a further dismemberment.
For the Austrians, who a year before had favored the prospect of a strengthened
and independent Poland, the situation was entirely changed, not only by the death
of Leopold II, and not only by the Russian occupation of Poland, but by the war
against France, which in the summer of 1792 the Austrians expected to be short
and successful. The Vienna cabinet revived its plan for the annexation of the terri-
tories of the house of Bavaria. The Elector of Bavaria could be readily compensated
by a transfer of his throne to Brussels; that is, the Austrians would give him their
ten Netherlands provinces in exchange for his various south German holdings. But
it could not be expected that Prussia and Russia would consent, without corre-
sponding gains for themselves, to the substantial growth of the Hapsburg monar-
chy as a German power. Kaunitz therefore changed his mind on Poland, and ac-
cepted the principle that, to enable Austria to acquire Bavaria, Prussia and Russia
must be allowed to take portions of Poland. A few months later, after Dumouriez’
victories, and the renewal of revolutionary activity in Belgium, when it seemed that
the Hapsburgs might be unable to retain their Netherlands provinces, and might
have to forego the Bavarian exchange, the availability of territory in Poland be-
came a matter of more poignant concern. Even at best, after the defeat of Dumou-
riez at Neerwinden, it seemed that the effort necessary for retaining Belgium
might be too great. It would be still more troublesome for Austria to acquire terri-
tory, such as Alsace, from France itself. It was now clear that Prussia and Russia
were about to engage in a second partition of Poland. It now seemed unfair to the
Austrians, a year after the three monarchies had entered upon their operations
against the revolutionary contagion, that Austria should have to work so hard for
its reward, while Prussia and Russia enjoyed the advantage of a more facile self-
enrichment. To quote one of the more candid expressions of the older diplomacy
(so often admired for its “style”), the Austrians protested that “the indemnities and
compensations due to the Emperor should have to wait upon conquests to be
28 This “confession” extorted from King Stanislas was published in the Annual Register for 1792;
see also Angeberg, 295–96.