484 Chapter XX
the Russian troops, making the situation so intolerable for them that Ingelström
left the city.
The question now faced by the leaders of the movement, as later by historians in
their interpretation of it, was whether it was to be thought of as a war of indepen-
dence or as a revolution. For Kosciuszko, the problem was to obtain maximum
unity among Poles, to give the mass of the people something to fight for. He be-
lieved from the beginning that this meant the abolition of serfdom. But abolition
of serfdom would offend many estate- owners, whose courage, military experience,
and dedication to independence were also needed. If “unity” included the lower
classes, the upper class would become disunited. If independence could be ob-
tained only by revolution, some would lose interest in independence. And Polish
historians have apparently been divided by the same issues, some preferring to see
in the movement of 1794 little more than a national uprising against foreigners,
while others find in it, in addition, an attempt to deal with class antagonisms, in-
cluding serfdom, in Poland.^16
In a rebellion against foreigners even the disillusioned Targowicans could now
take part. Mainly, however, the division was within the ranks of the anti- Russians of
1792, those who had been the constitutionalists of 1791 and the mild “revolutionar-
ies” of the Four Years’ Diet. The Right in this group, in 1794, meant those who
wished in getting rid of the Russians simply to restore and maintain the constitu-
tion of 1791. The Left were those who believed that, if anything at all were now to
be accomplished, much more than what the constitution had envisaged would have
to be done. These were the Polish “Jacobins.” Since no Pole applied the word “Jaco-
bin” to himself, the term is something of a misnomer, or a mere historian’s expression
taken over from counter- revolutionary polemics; but we may conclude, with Les-
nodorski, that, since many kinds of people called themselves “patriots,” and since
there did exist a category of militant patriots who resembled those of Western Eu-
rope, the word “Jacobin” can be conveniently used as a name for them.^17
The leader of the Right was none other than the king himself, the pathetic
Stanislas Poniatowski, the patriot- king who had virtually written the constitution
of 1791, and then been obliged under the most humiliating circumstances to dis-
own it. After the revolt in Warsaw, Stanislas came out openly for the insurrection,
hoping both to moderate it and to give it strength by contributing his prestige,
which, however dulled, was still royal. Actually, since he had capitulated once be-
fore, in July 1792, his return to the patriot ranks inspired little confidence, and in-
deed aroused typical Jacobin fears of aristocratic conspiracy and royal betrayal.
With the king stood various conservative nobles and well- to- do Warsaw burghers,
who were ardently anti- Russian, but feared the effects of upheaval among the Pol-
ish masses. Friends of the lower classes reciprocated their distrust.
Most of the Polish Jacobins were of the class called noble in Eastern Europe:
that is, they came from the middling and lesser landowning families, or from fami-
16 Lesnodorski, 28–86, gives an excellent account of the historiography, including a comment on
the work of Jacques Godechot and myself, 83.
17 Lesnodorski, 7–27, has a full discussion of the term “Jacobin” as used in Poland, and an exten-
sive treatment (239–61) of the changing meanings of other words in the Polish language (such as
“revolution,” “citizen,” “people,” etc.), summarized below.