516 Chapter XXI
Congress, Executive Power or Directory, or even constitutional King.” In July
1797: “I am positively decided not to return on any conditions founded on the
democratic basis of alleged rights of man and equality.” In short, William V would
not compromise with the Revolution. Among his other reasons, he knew that
Louis XVI had tried such a compromise, and come to a bad end.^21
The situation was complicated by the British occupation of the Dutch colonial
empire, which William V had sanctioned on his arrival in England. On the face of
it, the British were occupying the colonies to keep them out of the hands of the
French, or to protect the colonials of European origin, such as those at the Cape of
Good Hope, from the influence of revolutionary ideas. But there were few even
among William V’s advisers who believed that Britain would ever restore Ceylon
and the Cape to any Dutch government.^22 William V’s own followers, and his own
son, were dismayed at his willingness to protect his own interests at the expense of
the Dutch empire. As for the Dutch remaining in Holland, the fear of losing their
empire to Britain was one of the most powerful and realistic sentiments that held
them in a half- willing and half- reluctant alliance with France.
In 1797 the British and French governments were engaged in serious peace
talks, conducted for the British by the Earl of Malmesbury, the very man who had
outwitted the Dutch Patriots and restored the Orange dynasty in 1787. So suc-
cessful were French military operations on the Continent, and so difficult were
conditions for the British at home, that Malmesbury recommended, and Pitt had
almost agreed, that Britain should sign a treaty. By this treaty it would recognize
both the French and Batavian Republics and the French annexation of Belgium—
in return for retaining those of the Dutch colonies which it most desired, Ceylon
and the Cape of Good Hope. Reports of these discussions leaked out, and the
Dutch, both the Batavians and the émigrés, were indignant.
The Hereditary Prince, who by now was living in Germany, believed that his
father could no longer remain with dignity in England. His father thought other-
wise. The British had “saved” him in 1787. No one but the British could “save” him
again. In his mind there was simply nothing that anyone could do about British
intentions. As the Princess of Orange wrote in explanation to her son: “No one
will make a man budge for us without British money.”^23
The Hereditary Prince suggested to his father that he might do as well, for
Dutch interests, by approaches to France as by relying on England. William V
stuck to his opinion. He was more outraged that the French had annexed Flushing
and Maastricht, than that the British should take Ceylon and South Africa.
As events proceeded, to be explained later, the British gave up their momentary
inclination to accept the Batavian Republic, and turned increasingly to a positive
21 Ibid., 936, 948, 950, 971.
22 Ibid., 909, 980, 988–89. It was rumored that the British might offer St. Helena to the Dutch in
compensation. As it turned out, the British never returned Ceylon, but returned the Cape in 1802,
reoccupying it in 1806, and thereafter holding it.
23 Ibid., 896 n. 1, 900, 908, 986. On February 16, 1795, the British had authorized up to £30,000
(330,000 Dutch guilders) for underground purposes in the Batavian Republic. Grenville to Bentinck,
in Papers of J. B. Fortescue preserved at Dropmore, III, 20. At least £70,000 had been spent to overthrow
the Dutch Patriots in 1787, 417.