The Batavian Republic 525
tablishment of the Reformed religion. It provided for a bicameral legislature and
for a collegiate executive of five directors to supervise the ministries, as in France.
This constitution, submitted for popular ratification in April 1798, was over-
whelmingly adopted by a vote of 165,520 to 11,597. Pressure was brought at the
polls, where the anti- heredity oath was again exacted, so that conscientious Oran-
gists were excluded. The best evidence that the constitution suited a great majority
of the Dutch people is the fact that, when the democrats themselves were driven
from power, their democratic constitution was retained. It remained in effect until
replaced by the Bonapartist constitution of 1801, which modified only a few of its
principles. Unity, consolidation, equality of civil rights, and religious disestablish-
ment remained permanent. As the Dutch say of their work of 1798, they took the
medicine but threw away the bottle.
It was the behavior of the democrats rather than their constitution that led to
further discord. They did nothing really drastic; there was no attempt at social
revolution, general confiscation, or terror. They did, however, take steps to secure
themselves in power. There was a general scramble for office; the unitary central
government, using its newly acquired powers, put all sorts of democrats into local
jobs. It was called a purge but was not altogether different from the American
practice of “rotation.” What was more serious, and justified only by the familiar
argument of defense against reaction, the Dutch democrats also tried to purge the
voters, by excluding political rivals from the polls. It was of course true that British
and Orange agents were trying to subvert the new regime.
There was an upsurge of popular democratic excitement in which ideas like
those of the Paris sans- culottes or American democrats were expressed. An exam-
ple is offered by a certain obscure Lucas Butot. He was a warehouse keeper by
vocation and a Catholic. He was also a member of the secret committee of the
One and Indivisible Club at the time of the coup of January 22, and thereafter was
employed by the government to conduct local purges. He thought that all, includ-
ing the poorest, should vote, except for known Orangists and persons holding for-
eign investments, unless these were in France. He thus aimed at Dutch capitalists,
who held a good deal of wealth in England. The state, in his opinion, should ignore
all religious cults, and no clergy should be paid from the public purse. Merit should
be the only qualification for civil and military office. Officeholders should be mod-
estly paid (“a man can live well in the Batavian Republic on 3,000 guilders a year”);
and public offices or jobs should not be held by persons drawing income from their
own property or business, but be reserved for those who needed them to live. Such
persons, he believed, would in any case discharge the duties better. Modest pay-
ment of officeholders, added Butot, would make the effects of bribery immediately
visible. The money saved on officeholders and clergy should be put into the fleet, to
aid France in the joint war against Britain.^38
The inrush of really plain people, with popular ideas, created general consterna-
tion, even among upper- class persons known for democratic opinions. How much
the efficiency of government really suffered is endlessly debatable. Delacroix
stoutly defended it, as did many others; but it would seem in the nature of the case
38 Colenbrander, II, 709–10.