Mirage of the Moderates 543
its revolution.” But Montlosier’s arguments had little effect on those whom he
most wished to persuade.^25
Lally- Tollendal published his Défense des émigrés adressée au peuple français in
both London and Paris (where the press was at the time quite free) at the turn of
the year 1796–1797. His intention was to influence the coming French elections,
in which, without any “two-thirds rule,” a third of the members of the two cham -
bers were to be chosen. Moderates in all camps were optimistic. In France there
was a strong desire for peace, which it seemed might be more easily obtainable
with a constitutional monarchy than with a republican government. Moderates in
France, while adhering to the principles of 1789, and believing that events since
1792 had been at worst a piece of criminal excess and at best a necessity now hap-
pily over, were in a mood to make any compromises with the monarchy and the
emigration that they could consider reasonable and safe. Among the five Directors
themselves, Lazare Carnot, a mainstay of the Revolutionary Government three
years before, but now a Jacobin évolué, inclined to this opinion. Among the gener-
als, Pichegru, whose victories had brought the Batavian Republic into being, and
who still commanded the French Army of the North, was actually engaged in se-
cret correspondence with agents of Louis XVIII. England and France were carry-
ing on serious peace talks. The moderate émigrés in London took heart; they fol-
lowed developments in France very closely, and believed that the conciliatory views
of Thomas Erskine and Charles James Fox were gaining ground in England.
Lally- Tollendal’s arguments were highly realistic, and aimed straight at the po-
litical center. He made no plea for restoration of either the monarchy or the
church. Do not believe, he told his readers, the propaganda of those who say that
return of the émigrés means the return of privilege and feudal rights. There is only
one difference between us—property. By some compromise, the émigrés must re-
ceive back some of the property they have lost, and the present possessors of émi-
gré property must give up some of what they now hold. No questions need be
asked about former properties of the church. A union of old and new proprietors
should be formed, of constitutionalists both monarchist and republican, but with-
out regard to Louis XVIII or the ancien régime, while on the other hand presenting
a strong front against the Jacobins prolétaries.^26 This was a reference to Babeuf ’s
“communist” conspiracy discovered in 1796. In short, Lally- Tollendal proposed a
bargain. The extremes of Right and Left would be ignored. Decent Frenchmen
would defend themselves against both Bourbons and Babouvists. The still insecure
property titles of beneficiaries of the Revolution would be confirmed, and the émi-
grés languishing in exile would come home.
The elections held throughout France in March 1797 proved to be an over-
whelming repudiation of the Directory, and a victory, presumably, for the party of
compromise settlement, stabilization, and peace. To pursue the question of the fail-
ure of moderation in the First Republic we must now look at the two extremes.
25 Montlosier, Des effets de la violence et de la modération dans Ies affaires de la France (London,
1796), 2, 18, 42.
26 Defense, part ii, 170. Prolétaires was one of the new words given currency by the Revolution; its
association with “Jacobins” was mere name- calling, since the Jacobins were seldom proletarians.