778 Chapter XXXII
France at this time, torn by war and revolution, no party development such as oc-
curred in America could take place. If it could, the Jacobins of 1798 might have
become a kind of French Jefiersonian party. In any case, the Directory itself killed
the experiment.
The Directory, in short, with its middle way, had no friends. Among the French,
the regime by its very nature repelled both the former privileged orders and the
former sans- culottes and the working classes, and after Floréal it no longer ap-
pealed to the large body of democrats and republicans that the Revolution had
brought into being. French generals in occupied areas, even those who were firmly
republican, were disaffected toward the Directory as then constituted, if only be-
cause the Directors had tried to assert civilian authority over their operations, mili-
tary, political, and financial. Generals who favored the more revolutionary elements
in the sister- republics, like Championnet at Rome and Naples, and Brune at Milan
and later in Holland, accused the Paris government of moderatism and sympa-
thized with the French Jacobin opposition, by which in turn they were regarded as
heroes. In the sister- republics the most pronounced patriots had turned anti-
French. Still adhering to the aims of the Revolution, in Italy and elsewhere, they
believed that the interests of their new republics were sacrificed to those of France,
they objected to the coups d’état and to the looting and pillage, and they com-
plained of the more orderly requisitions which, not unreasonably in the circum-
stances, were designed to support the French armies.
It was widely agreed, in France and in Europe, that the regime in France was
about to undergo another abrupt mutation. The royal pretender, “Louis XVIII”—
largely forgotten in his own country, and unrecognized even by the Powers as a
king- in- exile—felt renewed hopes for his restoration. He had become more mod-
erate than in 1797. Evolving toward the mood for which he would be known in
1814, he now conceded, in 1799, that it would be necessary to deal with men in-
volved in the Revolution—that, as he wrote to his royal brother in July, “there can
be services which oblige us to close our eyes on the greatest crimes.”^1 But he made
no public promises or offer of guarantees, and he aroused no confidence or enthu-
siasm in France. Among the French émigrés his stock had risen. With the young
Duke of Orleans (the future Louis- Philippe) severely compromised by the Revo-
lution, and far off on a tour of America in any case, the idea of a restoration of
monarchical authority pointed straight at the “legitimate” candidate. Even Ma-
louet, who as a moderate and liberal émigré had thought in 1797 that no good
Frenchman could rally to Louis XVIII, rallied to him two years later, with or with-
out any constitution, charter, or prior statement of program or policy. It was neces-
sary, said Malouet, simply to rely on the new king’s discretion.^2 Even Mallet du
Pan, who was “moderate” at least in believing a total counter- revolution to be im-
possible, believed that Louis XVIII offered the only solution. Yet he was still the
Cassandra, darkly declaring to be essential what he knew to be out of the question.
Thus he said, in 1799 (as in 1793), that the Coalition needed the firm central con-
1 Quoted by G. Walter, Le comte de Provence (Paris, 1950), 335.
2 Mémoires de Malouet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1874), II, 529–30.