286 SERENISSIMA
In Dantyszek's time, Poland was approaching the zenith of its political
influence. His master, Sigismund I (1506-48), who sent no less than 148 diplo-
matic missions abroad, was the most active of all the Polish kings in the inter-
national field. In 1569 at the Union of Lublin, the Republic of Poland-Lithuania
emerged momentarily as the largest territory in Europe and the leading power
of the East. In the diplomatic language of the next two centuries, it was known,
like Venice, as 'Serenissima Kespublica'', 'The Most Serene Republic', 'La
Serenissme'. Throughout the modern period, whether nominatively or
accusatively, it was at the heart of European diplomacy.After the union of 1569, the democratic constitution of the Republic removed
diplomacy from direct royal control. According to the Pacta Conventa agreed
between king and nobility at the beginning of each reign, no ambassadors could
be appointed without the assent of the Senate. No treaties were valid until
ratified by the Sejm. For important negotiations, both chambers of the Sejm
would join in appointing parliamentary commissioners, who were considered to
possess the highest diplomatic status.
In practice, of course, the king retained considerable executive powers.
Although foreign policy was not conducted on his behalf but in the name of 'the
Senate and Republic', his influence was far greater than that of any other indi-
vidual. His was the most powerful voice in the periodic formal sessions of the
full Senate, which established the main principles of policy, as it was among the
sixteen resident senators, or in the senatus consilium (Senate Committee) which
directed everyday business in the long intervals between sessions. In normal
times, the king exercised close control over the four chancelleries - two for the
Kingdom and two for the Grand Duchy - and in particular over the lesser
Chancellery of the Kingdom, which customarily attended him on his progresses
and which was able to establish a dominant role in diplomatic affairs. There
were moments, as in 1609 under Sigismund Vasa, when the Sejm was prepared
to allow the King to decide on war and peace at his own discretion; and there
were others, as in 1656 under Jan Kazimierz, when the absence of the Sejm left
the king in sole command. It is true that some Polish kings may well have looked
with envy at the powers of their confreres elsewhere in Europe, who largely con-
trived, even in the constitutional monarchies, to keep foreign affairs within the
royal prerogative. But given skill, and a reasonable standing in the eyes of the
chief officers of state, they were far from helpless.
In accordance with the far-reaching dispersion of authority within the
Republic, the state did not claim a monopoly in diplomatic affairs. If the Sejm
or the Senate could prevent the king from making commitments of which they
did not approve, so equally there was no objection to the king persuing a private
policy of his own so long as the interests and resources of the state were not
thereby compromised. During the Vasa era, royal diplomacy undertaken by