DIPLOMACY IN POLAND-LITHUANIA 287courtiers as opposed to state officials, pressed the king's dynastic claims to the
Swedish throne through channels quite separate from those of the state. In the
Saxon Era, a very clear distinction was drawn between the undertakings of
the king and those of the Republic. It was quite possible for the Wettin, as
Elector of Saxony, to be at war with Sweden for example, whilst the same man,
as King of Poland-Lithuania, was at peace. The Hetmans, or army comman-
ders, were empowered from the early sixteenth century to enter diplomatic
relations as an adjunct to their military duties. Especially in the south and east,
whence communication with Warsaw was excessively slow, a Hetman would
fight a campaign or sign a truce with the Muscovites or Tartars on his own law-
ful initiative. In the process, he regularly sent envoys to Moscow or to the
Crimea, and received embassies in return. The great magnates claimed similar
licence, although in their case the line between constitutional and treasonable
conduct was harder to define. Certainly the Radziwill who signed his private
treaty with the invading Swedes in 1655 was a traitor, and was universally con-
demned as such. But earlier in the seventeenth century, when Chancellor
Zamoyski used his personal army and his private diplomacy to make and to
unmake the Hospodars of Moldavia, he did so with impunity. In Muscovy's
'Time of Troubles', it was the private adventures of George Mniszek and his fel-
low-conspirators who, contrary to the wishes of the Sejm, dragged Poland into
the internecine struggles of Russia. Increasingly, the Polish magnates acted
much like the princes of Germany — as virtually independent rulers whose over-
lord was too distant and too preoccupied to care. In times of Confederation,
when the nobility convoked armed leagues for the pursuit of legal political
objectives, the Confederate leaders were fully entitled to use diplomatic means
in support of then campaign. During the Great Northern War these confedera-
tions lasted for decades, and diplomacy was fragmented to a degree far beyond
the control of any central authority. At various times, both the city of Danzig
and the Cossacks of the Dnieper maintained their own diplomatic services with
the full consent of the state authorities. During the frequent interregna, conduct
of foreign affairs traditionally fell to the Primate, the Archbiship of Gniezno,
who as interrex was empowered to pursue yet another category of 'primatial
diplomacy'.
The division of administrative responsibility was no less complicated than
that of executive authority. In each of the separate administrations of the
Kingdom and the Grand Duchy, the care and supervision of foreign diplomats,
and the coordination of different sections of the Republic's diplomatic service
was ascribed to the Marshal. The diplomatic secretariats were the responsibil-
ity of the Chancellors, but were usually managed by one of the vice-chancellors,
or podkancerz. As time went on, the administration of the Kingdom was by far
the more important, although the Lithuanians for long emphasized their right to
supervise relations with Muscovy. In the Kingdom, a Chief Secretary or secre-
tarius supremus co-ordinated the work of the secretariat, whilst four chief
notaries or pronotarii acted as heads of department. The latter specialized in