404 AGONIA
unexpected political reversals within the first three months. The Russian victory
owed less to the brilliance of Suvorov than to the pusillanimity of Stanislaw-
August and the treachery of Frederick-William. On 18 June at Zielence, the
Polish forces repulsed the Russians with heavy losses. The leading officers were
decorated by the King with medals, and inducted into his new Order of Virtuti
Militari. But then the King lost heart. He watched in dismay as two Russian
armies advanced in a wide pincer movement, forcing Kosciuszko's defence of
the Bug at Dubienka on 18 July, and threatening to encircle Warsaw. In August,
almost without warning, he announced his adherence to the Confederation of
Targowica, and ordered his troops to hold their fire. It was a shocking betrayal,
executed for the most humane of motives. Faced by the Russians' threefold
numerical superiority - 96,000 men to 36,000 on the Polish side - he wanted to
save his country unnecessary suffering. The Army dispersed. The commanding
officers and the reforming politicians left hurriedly for exile. Warsaw was occu-
pied without opposition. Further resistance was scattered, prolonged, and
pointless.^24
On the diplomatic front, the Russian success was ensured by means of a bilat-
eral pact with Prussia. In the preceding years, when the Russians and Austrians
were still engaged against the Turks, Frederick-William II had encouraged their
adversaries, including the reformers in the Polish Sejm. In January 1790, he had
made overtures to the Porte, and in March his ambassador in Warsaw,
Luchesini, had negotiated a formal treaty of friendship with the Republic. In the
event of an attack on Poland-Lithuania, Prussia was to supply an army of
18,000 men for Poland's defence. Prussia was to be rewarded with the cession
of Danzig and Thorn, whilst Poland could be compensated by the restoration of
Austrian Galicia. But there Prussian intrigues ended. At the Congress of
Reichenbach (Dzierzoniow) in Silesia, convoked in June 1790 at Austrian insis-
tence, Frederick-William's representatives were persuaded to abandon their
anti-Austrian schemes. The Polish representative, Jablonowski, flatly denied
that the Republic would ever cede Danzig or Thorn to anyone. The news from
Paris was driving the monarchies together. In August 1791, at the Congress of
Pilsnitz (Pitczyce), attended by the French King's brothers (the future Louis
XVIII and Charles X), Frederick-William met the Emperor Leopold in person,
and agreed to support the principle of Monarchy wherever it was threatened. In
February 1792, in anticipation of the first Revolutionary War, Prussia and
Austria entered an anti-Revolutionary alliance. In this situation, Catherine
could dispose of Poland as she thought fit. The Poles could be crushed as dan-
gerous Jacobins without fear of outside interference. The Prussians, already
engaged in France, could be invited to approve Russian action in Poland or to
answer for the consequences if they refused. Frederick-William could not hesi-
tate. At a convention signed on 7 August 1792, he agreed to the Russian plan on
condition that he was paid off with a suitable share of the proceeds. By a simple
act of treachery, he enlarged his kingdom, and abandoned the Poles to their fate.
Thus, when the Russian Army was completing its conquest, the Republic