24 POLSKA
about 154,000 km^2 (60,157 square miles), the Congress Kingdom between 1815
and 1874 about 117,000 km^2 (49,609 square miles). At its first twentieth-century
reincarnation, between 1921 and 1938, the Polish Republic occupied 389,720
km^2 (152,234 square miles) and fifth place in Europe. Since 1945, on a more
westerly base, it has occupied 312,677 km^2 (122,139 square miles) and sixth
place in Europe. Unlike the English, who could always retreat behind the
Channel and their Navy, unlike the Spaniards or Italians on their self-contained
peninsulas, unlike the Swiss amid their Alps or the Dutch behind their dykes, the
Poles have had nowhere to hide. Their state has been exposed to every ebb and
flow of political power in modern Europe, and the tides have left it alternately
stranded and submerged. (See Map 2.)
In view of these violent changes, it is impossible to talk of 'the Polish lands'
without regard to the fourth dimension. Despite the Poles' own fervent belief in
the macierz or 'motherland', it is impossible to identify any fixed territorial base
which has been permanently, exclusively, and inalienably, Polish. The Polish
macierz has not always corresponded to reality, and has often stood in sharp
conflict with similar German and Russian fictions concerning the limits and
extent of 'the German soil' or of 'our Russian land'. At various times in Eastern
Europe, the Polish state has been everywhere and nowhere. Its territory, like the
settlement patterns, cultural alignment, and ethnic mix of its population, has
been subject to continual transformations. Poland has been a butterfly, gone
today but here tomorrow, flitting from one mode of existence to the next. In the
terminology of the Prussian historians who first expounded East Central Europe
to the world at large, Poland was a Saisonstaat, a 'seasonal state'.
These considerations are so obvious, however, that it is odd why some people
should imagine that they apply exclusively to Poland. They equally apply to
Poland's neighbours. Poland's position on the European plain is essentially sim-
ilar to that of Germany, and is no less exposed than that of Russia. If one were
to exchange the Vistula for the Elbe, the Odra for the Rhine, the Carpathians for
the Bavarian Alps, and the Baltic for the North Sea, the geopolitical situation
would not have been significantly changed. Similarly, the modern USSR, from
the Bug to the Ussuri, is bounded in the north by a cold, hostile sea and possesses
a serviceable mountain barrier only in the south. So, if there is a link between
the geopolitics of the great plains and the impermanency of state structures,
Poland should be seen more as a classic example than as a unique case. In the
longer perspective, the rise and fall of Poland may prove to have been no more
dramatic than the history of Prussia or Muscovy. After all, the disappearance of
Prussia since 1945 has been more complete than that of Poland in 1795 or 1939.
And if the USSR is still at the height of its imperial power, there is no reason to
suppose it is eternal. It has the misfortune to occupy not just the tiny European
Plain, but the vast Eurasian plain as well. The fatal confrontation on two fronts
which has often faced the Polish Republic, and which destroyed the united
German Reich between 1914 and 1945, is now facing the USSR on a far grander
scale.