THE POLISH LAND 45examples could be cited. In the Lustracja of the Palatinate of Cracow in 1564,
for instance, the district of Podhale was held in lease from the Crown by the
Pieniazek family. One brother, Jan Pieniazek, chief Magistrate of the Cracow
District, held a group of six villages in the upper valley of the Raba. The other,
Prokop, Pieniazek, proved his right to a somewhat larger tenancy immediately
to the south. He held ten villages in addition to the town of Nowy Targ. Of
these, along the headwaters of the Dunajec - by far the most valuable was the
manor of Szaflary, which commanded the site of what today is the mountain
resort of Zakopane. The detailed descriptions of these isolated rural commun-
ities composed in a macaronic jumble of Polish and Latin immortalize those his-
toric moments when the inhabitants of the immemorial countryside first
surrendered their anonymity to the agents of the modern state (see Table, pages
46 and 47). Szaflary was specially remote as a result of the mountainous terrain;
but it did not differ significantly from thousands of similar estates across the
length and breadth of the land.
The correlation between the state and the nature of the terrain on which it is sit-
uated poses some of the most fascinating problems of political geography.
Phrases such as 'river valley despotisms' or 'Gulf Stream democracies' have been
coined in attempts to explain why particular locations have spawned particular
forms of government. In Western Europe, no one would dispute that the Swiss
Alps, the English Channel, the Dutch dykes, or the Venetian lagoon have effect-
ively sheltered the democracies which grew up under their protection. In Eastern
Europe, Russia provides the classic example of how extreme conditions of space,
climate, and poverty can foster correspondingly extreme traditions of autocracy.
In these general arguments, the Polish—Lithuanian Republic occupies an
interesting place. If Muscovy was the home of the 'patrimonial state', where
everything and everyone was put to the absolute disposition of the ruler, it is
curious that Muscovy's immediate neighbour should have developed precisely
the opposite tendency. If Poland-Lithuania occupied a transitional location
between Europe and Russia, one might have expected it to have manifested a
transitional blend of European and Russian practices. But this is not the case.
The Polish-Lithuanian state was as completely decentralized as the Russian
state was centralized. Its ruler was as limited as the Tsar was absolute. Its
regions were as wayward, as the Russian provinces were controlled. Its noble
citizens were as free as the subjects of the Tsar were bonded. Its policy was as
passive as that of Russia was active; and its failure was as great as Russia's suc-
cess. The two great states which between them dominated Eastern Europe in the
modern period were as different as chalk and cheese.
Like Muscovy, Poland was essentially a land-locked community. Despite mod-
ern propaganda, which pays great attention to supposed maritime traditions,
Poland's connections with the Baltic were extremely slender. The link with