98 PREUSSEN
dynastic empires. In Prussian politics, German Unification had been a cause of
the Left. It was espoused by the liberal opposition but dreaded by the conserva-
tive court and government, and it was taken to be entirely compatible with
Polish Independence. Karl Marx was but one of many progressive Germans,
moved by the tragedy of the 1831 Rising and by the Berlin Trial of 1847, who
put Polish and German aspirations in the same programme:
The independence of the Polish nation is essential for no one more than for us Germans.
What is it that has supported the power of Reaction in Europe ever since 1815, not to say
from the first French Revolution? The Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. And
what is it that has held the Holy Alliance together? The Partitions of Poland, of which all
three members of the Alliance have been beneficiaries.
Of course, it is not just a matter of creating some sort of sham Poland, but of creating a
strong and viable state.. At the least, Poland must occupy the territory of 1772, together
with the catchment areas and the mouths of its great rivers, and must possess an exten-
sive belt of the Baltic coastline.
Marx himself continued to hold these views for the rest of his life. Yet 1848 ush-
ered in an era of uncertainty. In 1848, the German liberals did not fail to note
that the Poles of Posen stood to obstruct full German unification. Friedrich
Engels was one to react sharply. Writing to Marx on 2.3 May 1851 on the ques-
tion of Posnania, he expressed opinions which would have been quite unaccept-
able only three years earlier.
The more I reflect upon history, the more clearly I see that the Poles are completely foutu
as a nation and that they can only be useful as a means to an end up to the time when
Russia herself is drawn into the agrarian revolution. From that moment, Poland will no
longer have any raison d'etre whatsoever. The Poles have never done anything in history
except commit outrageous quarrelsome stupidities. It would be impossible to cite a sin-
gle occasion when Poland, even as against Russia, had successfully represented progress
or done anything whatever of historical significance...^14
The contrast between Marx in 1848 and Engels in 1851 nicely illustrates the shift
which even then was taking place in German opinion. Engels himself recanted
his anti-Polish outburst in order to maintain solidarity with Marx. But for most
Germans, the change of heart was permanent. Under Bismarck, German
Unification was adopted by the Prussian Right, and after 1871, the united and
victorious Reich was welcomed by Left and Right alike. Any attempt to ques-
tion the integrity of the Empire was seen as a treasonable threat to the general
security and prosperity. In all nationalist debates, the Prussian establishment
had been given to striking a lofty, neutral pose, judging any form of national-
ism, whether Polish or German, as vulgar, unnecessary, and beneath one's dig-
nity. But as Prussian views were gradually submerged into the newer
enthusiasms of the Reich, so German hostility against Polish nationalism was
able to grow. And the Poles responded in kind.
In the last decades before the First World War attitudes sharpened on both
sides. On the German side, the hysterical chauvinism of Wilhelmian era made