156 KOSCIOLorder, 'Render unto Caesar' was the recommended text in all political matters.
Polish Catholics were constantly enjoined to turn their thoughts to things eter-
nal, and to leave the affairs of this world to the legitimate, anointed authorities.
In the 1790s, the agony of the old Republic was viewed in Rome as a fitting
reward for the Jacobins and libertarians who had supposedly led their country
to disaster. In the post-Napoleonic decades, the maintenance of the Holy
Alliance, and by implication the perpetuation of the Partitions of Poland, was
accepted as Rome's first diplomatic priority. At the end of the century, an
encyclical of Pope Leo XIII openly commended the principle of Triloyalism to
all the Polish bishops. Of course, it would be wrong to imagine that the Vatican
enjoyed perfect relations with the partitioning powers. Constant difficulties
arose not only with Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia, but also with
Catholic Austria, where the Josephine spirit lingered on. None of the ruling
Empires was prepared to grant the Catholic Church unrestricted control over its
appointments, over its property, or over the education of youth. For this reason,
the Vatican was not prepared to risk further deterioration in Church — State
relations. The Popes had no direct means of exerting pressure on rulers who
contravened the declarations of religious toleration; but by failing to speak out
in public in defence of justice and compassion, they lost a large measure of their
moral standing.^6
The Vatican's failure to support successive Polish Risings gave deep offence
in Poland. Despite the fact that the Confederates of Bar saw themselves as cham-
pions of the Catholic faith, neither Clement XIII nor Clement XIV uttered a
word in their defence. The latter pontiff openly welcomed the First Partition
on the grounds that the 'Apostolic Empress', Maria Theresa, could henceforth
protect the Church more effectively. In 1792., Pius VI blessed the efforts of the
Confederation of Targowica, 'to bring calm and happiness to the Republic'. In
1793, he rejected the Polish ambassador's appeals for aid against Russia; and in
1795, horrified by the confiscation of Church silver and the lynching of prelates
by the Warsaw mob, he ordered the hierarchy to co-operate in full with the par-
titioners. In 1832, Gregory XVI condemned the November Rising in terms
which later he found hard to retract. 'These terrible calamities', he wrote in an
encyclical to the Polish bishops, 'have no other source than the manoeuvres of
certain purveyors of fraud and lies who use the pretext of religion to raise their
heads against the legitimate power of princes.' During the January Rising, Pius
IX delayed his criticisms of Russian conduct until the insurrectionaries were vir-
tually defeated. His encyclical of 24 April 1864, berating 'the potentate who
oppresses his Catholic subjects' began with the unhappy words Vae mihi quia
tacui (Woe to me that I kept silent...). At the end of the century, the association
of Polish nationalism with Socialism, especially in the programme of the PPS,
caused the Church constant misgivings. Not until August 1920, when the future
Pius XII, then papal Nuncio in Warsaw, stood on the ramparts of Radzymin and
cursed the advancing hordes of Antichrist in person, did the Vatican express any
obvious sympathy for the Polish cause.