THE MILITARY TRADITION 197professional acadamies, uniforms, regulations, and armament industries. But
their divided counsels ignored the requirements of mutual defence. By 178.1,
the ratio of trained soldiers in the service of the state to the adult male popu-
lation had reached 1:472-. This derisory statistic compared with 1:153 in
France, 1:90 in Austria, 1:49 in Russia, and 1:26 in Prussia. Here was a fine
paradox indeed. Europe's most militarized society was incapable of defending
itself. The individualist military traditions of the nobility may well have pre-
disposed the Poles to the insurrections of the nineteenth century; but they
could not save the noble Republic.^2 (See Vol. I, Chapters 17, 18.)
The military establishment of the state was revived in Poland by Stanislaw-
August, and continued intermittently for sixty-six years. From 1765 to 1831,
constant attempts were made to develop Polish military potential to a level com-
mensurate with that of the neighbouring countries. For most of this period, an
independent Polish army was in existence. Defeats and disbandments were not
sufficient to destroy a certain continuity in traditions and personnel. The revival
began in 1765 with the founding of the Korpus Kadetow (Cadet Corps), a milit-
ary college designed to raise a new generation of officers in the spirit of patriot-
ism and enlightenment. It was continued after 1775 by the Military Department
of the Permanent Council, which abolished the old 'national' and 'foreign'
contingents and began to form the cadres of a centralized and consolidated
Army of the Republic. The artillery corps was refounded; the cavalry was reor-
ganized, a code of military regulations was introduced; theoretical works were
published by J. Bakatowicz and J. Jakubowski. By 1788, when the Great Sejm
first voted for a standing army of 100,000 men, the capacity to realize this goal
undoubtedly existed. Only four short years remained, however, before the
Russian wars of 1792. and 1794. Individual brilliance could not compensate for
deficiencies in training, weapons, and numbers. Kosciuszko's plan to mobilize
the peasantry on the basis of one infantryman for every 5 dym of land, swelled
the ranks of his insurrectionary army to more than 100,000 men.^3 But it could
not match the disciplined professional formations of Prussia and Russia. Even
so, the experience gained was not entirely lost. Kosciuszko himself was but one
distinguished product of the Korpus Kadetow, and his own subordinates —
Kniaziewicz, D^browski, Zaj^czek, Niemcewicz - were to provide the back-
bone of the Polish Legions (1797-1802), the Army of the Duchy of Warsaw
(1807-13), and the Polish Army of the Congress Kingdom (1815-31).
The Napoleonic episode initiated three decades of strong French influence. If
the impact of the Legions was mainly psychological, the introduction of six-year
conscription in 1807, affecting every man in the Duchy of Warsaw between 21
and 28 years of age, brought military experience and training to the broad mass
of the population. Napoleonic strategy and tactics of surprise and attack were
well matched to memories of the Szlachta's fighting habits and to legends of
Tarnowski and Sobieski. In the three-year Elementary School, and the annual
Application Course [Szkota Aplikacyjna), systematic attention was paid to mil-
itary and technical education. (See Chapter 12.)