236 KONGRESOWKA
reinstated. After three weeks, Czartoryski emerged as the President of a ruling
Council. On 18 January, he took over from Chtopicki, and the second stage
began. It was to last until May. Meanwhile, he had to fight the war.
The outcome of the Russo-Polish War of 1831 was not a foregone conclusion.
The absolute numerical superiority of the Russian forces was dissipated by their
need to occupy and garrison all the area they controlled, by long lines of com-
munication, and by their necessarily offensive posture. The Poles, in contrast,
were operating on their own ground, amidst a friendly population, from a cen-
tral and well-defined base in Warsaw. The Polish Army was organized round
professional cadres, whose equipment and training were superior in every
branch except the artillery. On several occasions in the first three months, it
inflicted terrible casualties on the Russians who were repeatedly frustrated in
their attempts to advance. Its weaknesses lay principally in the high command
and, by extension, in morale. There was a striking difference between the dash
and courage of the troops and the extreme caution and indecision of the General
Staff which, after Chlopicki fell in battle in February, was headed by General
Jan Skrzynecki (1787-1860). Skrzynecki had little belief in victory, and made
several approaches to Diebitsch to arrange a political settlement. He had even
less faith in the politicians, in whose work he increasingly interfered. As a cleri-
cal and conservative, he could not abide the growing influence of the 'Reds' and
lost his post in August amidst charges and countercharges of treason and con-
spiracy. In every field, he earned his name of Kunktator (the Delayer), exercis-
ing a negative influence on his subordinates - Henryk Dembiriski, Jozef Bern,
Jan Krukowiecki, and in particular on his talented Chief-of-Staff, Ignacy
Pradzyriski (1792-1850). At first, the army performed well. The initial Russian
offensive was brought to a halt by a series of fierce rearguard actions: at Stoczek
on 14 February, at Dobre and Wawer and at the bloody struggle of Grochow
near Warsaw on 2.5 February, where Diebitsch suffered almost ten thousand
casualties. A Polish counter-offensive brought two major victories to
Pradzyriski, who annihilated one Russian corps at D^by Wielkie on 31 March,
taking ten thousand prisoners, and dispersing another at Iganie on 10 April. It
was accompanied by two enterprising raids, one into Volhynia arid the Ukraine
by General Dwernicki and the other into Lithuania by General Gielgud.
Inexcusably, the Polish successes were followed by a prolonged period of inac-
tivity. Diebitsch was allowed to regroup to the north. On 26 May at OstroleJsa,
he destroyed the cream of the Polish infantry. Bern's enterprising deployment of
rocket forces could not prevent a decisive defeat. Thereafter, the initiative lay in
Russian hands.^12
The political crisis which developed in Warsaw in June is usually ascribed to
the defeat at Ostroteka. But it can equally be argued that the mistakes of the
General Staff which precipitated Ostroleka were themselves engendered by
political divisions already far advanced. Political and military disintegration
went hand in hand. For three months, Czartoryski patiently pursued a diplo-
matic policy in Vienna, Paris, and London, whilst holding off the clamours for