2.86 FENIKS
of Workers and Peasant Deputies.^19 But this Bolshevik initiative cannot be con-
sidered as anything more than a private statement of intent. At this stage, the
Bolsheviks had no authority in Russia; and their pronunciations on Poland car-
ried no more weight than the resolutions of workers' committees in Warsaw,
Berlin, or Tokyo on the future of Russia. Their earliest authoritative statement
on the Polish Question came in the third clause of the Decree of 29 August 1918
denouncing the former secret Treaties, including the Partitions. Even then, they
had no means of enforcing their views, and no intention of making specific com-
mitments. No one knew what the Bolsheviks understood by 'Poland'.
The February Revolution in Russia coincided with the rapidly intensifying
American interest in the problems of the war. At a meeting with Paderewski in
November 1916, President-elect Woodrow Wilson recorded his first known
expression of sympathy for the idea of an independent Poland. On 21 January
1917, in his first State of the Union Address to the Senate, he made mention of a
'united Poland' and its right of 'access to the sea'. One year later, on 8 January
1918, the thirteenth of Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' on peace aims spoke of a
'united, independent and autonomous Poland with free, unrestricted access to
the sea'. This generous statement of American views on Poland was the only
such statement by a leader of the Powers which was not extracted by the force
of events.^20
In 1917-18, the policy of all the Western Powers towards Poland changed out
of all recognition. Partly as a result of the American entry in the war on their
side, partly as a result of the Russian collapse, but largely as a result of their des-
perate search for any means possible of embarrassing Germany, they aban-
doned their former rigid opposition to Polish Independence. But they did so
grudgingly. As late as 11 March 1917, the French government signed an under-
taking with Russia not to interfere in Russian frontier arrangements. On 22
March, Lord Hugh Cecil reminded Parliament that British recognition of Polish
Independence was equivalent to the Russians proposing Home Rule for Ireland.
One month later on 2.6 April, in line with the Provisional government's
Declaration, Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, welcomed Poland on
behalf of HMG. In June, in France, Poincare's decree formalizing arrangements
for the Polish Army pushed matters still further. In September, the French gov-
ernment's unilateral recognition of the KNP as the official body for political liai-
son with the Polish army caused general consternation. There was much
confusion over the exact terms of the recognition agreement, and the British
feared that the French had stolen a march on them. British recognition of the
KNP in October was phrased in deliberately vague language and exclusively in
the interest of Anglo-French solidarity. Even so, it was soon regretted. Dmowski
could not now be prevented from behaving as if he were the Crown Prince of the
future Polish State. General pronouncements on Polish Independence were by
now fairly common. But the first specific joint guarantee by all the Allies for the
'restoration of Poland in its historical and geographic limits' was not made until
2 March 1918, and then only in curiously obscure circumstances. It was made at