32.0 NIEPODLEGLOSC
common 'Peace Front' with the USSR, on the mistaken assumption that they
could strike a bargain with Stalin and still dictate the terms. Stalin, like Hitler,
was soon convinced that Allied policy was frivolous. In May, he dismissed the
long-suffering Maxim Litvinov, with his Western connections, and installed in
his place as Foreign Commissar the crude and impatient Vyecheslav Molotov.
No significant agreement breakthrough was reached in the Allied - Soviet talks,
which dragged on through the summer in Moscow.
Oddly enough, the coolest and clearest assessment of Poland's predicament
was made neither in London nor in Warsaw, but from within the Axis camp by
Mussolini's Foreign Minister and son-in-law, Count Ciano:
16 April (1939). Two long conversations with Goering ... I was most struck by the tone
in which he described relations with Poland. It was strangely reminiscent of the tone
which not so long ago was used in Germany with regard to Austria and
Czechoslovakia. Yet the Germans are mistaken if they think that they can carry on in
the same manner. The Poles will be beaten; but they will not lay down their arms with-
out a fierce and bloody struggle.
17 April (1939). I accompanied Goering to the station ... On the whole, I got the impres-
sion that peaceful intentions still prevail even in Germany. Poland is the only danger
that exists. I was less impressed by the substance of the comments directed against
Warsaw, than by their contemptuous tone. The Germans should not imagine that
they are simply going to hold a victory parade in Poland. If the Poles are attacked, they
will fight. The Duce is of the same opinion.
15 May (1939). Conversation with Wieniawa [the retiring Polish ambassador in Rome].
.. I urged him to show the greatest moderation. Whatever will happen, Poland will
pay the cost of the conflict. No Franco-British assistance will be forthcoming, at least,
not in the first phase of the war; and Poland would quickly be turned into a heap of
ruins. Wieniawa admits that I am right on many points, but believes in some eventual
success that might give Poland greater strength. Alas, I fear that many, too many,
Poles share his illusions.^38
Meanwhile, the Nazis were awaiting their chance to exploit the fears and
prejudices of the USSR. They knew that the Russians' hatred and contempt for
Poland was no less than their own. Hitler repeatedly postponed his military
plans, uneasy about the unresolved diplomatic situation. Then, in July, the
break came. Under the cover of German-Soviet trade talks, Ribbentrop inti-
mated that there was 'no problem' that could not be amicably resolved.
Molotov responded the next morning. Amidst great secrecy, the terms were pre-
pared. A public Pact of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR would
bring the era of uncertainty in Eastern Europe to an end. At the same.time, a
Secret Protocol, designed to facilitate Germany's military preparations, envis-
aged the partition of Poland and the Baltic States between the two contracting
parties. This Protocol spelled out Poland's death warrant:
Moscow, 2.3 August 1939
On the occasion of the Non-Aggression Pact between the German Reich and the USSR,
the undersigned plenipotentiaries... discussed the boundaries of their respective spheres
of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions: