POLAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 325of the combined British and French armies when they, too, faced their baptism
of fire in May 1940.
Every popular history of the campaign paints the picture of 'brave but fool-
ish' Polish uhlans charging the German Panzers on horseback. It even happens
to contain a grain of truth. In one or two places, isolated squadrons of Polish
cavalry found themselves surprised by tanks and, despite their orders to the con-
trary, did try to fight their way out in the traditional fashion. Short of surrender,
it was the only thing that cavalrymen could do. Yet it is quite unreasonable to
accept such incidents as evidence for the mad courage, or for the technical
incompetence, of the Polish Army as a whole. As the Germans learned to their
cost in the later campaign in Russia, cavalry units were far from obsolete in the
conditions of the Eastern Front. Red Army cavalry provided vital support to
armoured and infantry divisions throughout the war. The Poles were indeed
courageous; but they were not necessarily foolish. They were faced with an
enemy whom they had never expected to face alone, and they were deserted by
their allies. In the bitterness and humiliation of defeat, it was entirely natural
that they themselves should propagate a legend which showed how they lost
with a gesture of glamorous defiance. It is entirely natural that people in the
West and in Russia, unwilling to recognize the unworthy parts played by their
own governments in 1939, should also want to believe it.^4
The Polish forces lost some 60,000 men killed, and 140,000 wounded. The
civilian casualties numbered many more. The Western Allies, who declared war
against Germany on 3 September, had not fired a shot in Poland's defence. At
the end of the month, the acting head of the British Military Mission in Warsaw,
General Adrian Carton de Wiart arrived in London via Romania, and was
received in Whitehall. General Ironside, the Chief of Imperial General Staff,
commented: 'Your Poles haven't put up much of a show, have they?' Neville
Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister inquired, Tell me, General, what effect
have our leaflet raids had?'^5
The entry of the Red Army into Poland on 17 September has never been prop-
erly explained. It prompted Churchill's famous remark that 'Russia is a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.' Unknown to Churchill, of course, the
invasion had been envisaged by the secret protocol of 23 August. Even so, its
timing was highly peculiar. The German Command called on Stalin to join them
as soon as they attacked; but Stalin had declined. In accordance with the 'hyena
principle' for which Soviet policy was justly famed, it would have made better
sense to delay the advance until the Wehrmacbt had completed the actual fight-
ing. Yet Stalin did not do that either. Instead, he ordered his forces to march
when the campaign was only half complete. As far as one could tell, he was
guided by a German forecast on 9 September that Warsaw would fall within the
week, and by another communique on the 16th, which announced that Warsaw
was already in German hands. This sequence of events would neatly explain
Molotov's curious rationalization of Soviet actions. One need only imagine the
mortification of the Soviet leaders on the following day, when they realized that