390 GRANICE
Ukrainian SSR, as in the classrooms of the Ukrainian Emigration, children were
still told that the Poles who once ruled in Kiev, and who once formed the single
largest community in the population of the districts of L'viv, Ivanofrankivsk
(Stanislawow), and Ternopil, were 'foreign oppressors', 'alien intruders', or
'imperialist landlords'. Mutatis mutandis, they were given exactly the same pic-
ture which old-fashioned Polish nationalists, (and their successors among Polish
communist ideologues) would paint of the German presence in points west. It
was nicely calculated to keep all the old antagonisms alive.^37
Slowly, however, new opinions were beginning to emerge. Scholars were
appearing who wrote more of the ancient and common heritage of the Poles and
the Ukrainians, and less of their modern divergences. The millennium of
Polish-Ukrainian relations was fast approaching; and someone in the coming
celebrations could be expected to recount the pros as well as the cons of the
thousand years since Prince Volodymir (Vladimir) of Kiev launched his expedi-
tion against the 'Liakhs' in 981. Two invidious myths needed to be laid - the
first, that Poland's role in the east was entirely positive, and secondly that it was
entirely negative. There are now historians who are prepared to debate whether
the old Polish-Lithuanian state was not a stepmother, if not a Mother, to
Ukrainians and Poles alike. There are historians who regret the failure of the
Union of Hadziacz as much as others rejoice in the success of Khmyelhytsky's
Rebellion. There are historians who compare the striking similarity between the
Russian Empire's successful absorption of Ukraine between 1654 and 1787,
through the successive phases of protective association, limited autonomy, and
full integration, with Russia's parallel policy towards Poland after 1717. All
these studies promise to moderate the tone of Polish—Ukrainian attitudes.
Above all, they challenge both Poles and Ukrainians to examine the underlying
assumptions of the Nationalism which reigned for so long not only in their
History, but also in their Historiography. They may serve to show that neither
the Nation nor the Nation-State possesses moral validity in its own right, but
only when it is promoted in conjunction with the basic ethical values of charity,
humanity, and respect for the individual. 'Gentlemen, in the name of what do
you want a national, independent, sovereign state?' Here perhaps was the cen-
tral issue in the modern history and politics of Eastern Europe. In the hands of
intolerant militants, Nationalism can be as oppressive, as cruel, and as repulsive
as the Imperialism and the Absolutism whose iniquities originally brought it
into being. In the process of re-evaluation, the historian's contribution must be
to present the realities of the past in all their manifold variety. For too long, one-
sided pessimistic prejudices have prevailed. Among the Poles, the best-known
quotation on the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations comes from
Sienkiewicz's magnificent but notorious concluding sentence of Ogniem I
Mieczem (By Fire and Sword): 'Nienawisc wzrosia w sercach, i zatruta krew
probratymcze' (And Hatred swelled in people's hearts and poisoned the blood
of brothers).^38 It now appears that other, more reconciliatory quotations can be
found. Even in the era when Polish-Ukrainian antagonism was being fuelled by