THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 439the course of the summer, Gomulka resurfaced in Party circles, and made his
mark in a series of analytical articles privately circulated among the upper ech-
elons. The details of the debate were superfluous. Everyone knew Gomulka's
past and what he stood for; and they knew that his supporters were gaining
ground over their opponents. His impending victory was signalled at the begin-
ning of October by the resignation of Hilary Mine. An attempted coup by
Rokossowski was forestalled by Party workers who circulated the Soviet
Marshal's alleged list of proscribed persons. On 21 October at the 8th Plenum
of the Central Committee, 'Comrade Wieslaw' was unanimously elected First-
Secretary on the platform of reasserting genuine Leninist principles in state and
party life. His election was attended by ominous rumours that Soviet Army units
were moving on Warsaw, and that Nikita Krushchev had landed at Okfcie
Airport in an apoplectic mood of undisguised rage.
The confrontation between Gomulka and Krushchev was dangerous while it
lasted; but it was quickly resolved on amicable lines. Gomulka could argue with
reason that his loyalty to the communist movement was beyond reproach; that
his brand of communism was based on a special understanding of Polish prob-
lems; and that the preservation of Stalinism was no more justified in Poland than
in the USSR. Krushchev, for his part, was furious that the decisions of the
Plenum had not been cleared in advance in Moscow, and was worried lest
the Polish example would trigger more serious insubordination elsewhere in the
Soviet bloc. This was the first time that Moscow's claim to automatic control
over the affairs of a fraternal party had ever been ignored. The lines of conflict
were sharply drawn. The Soviet Army in Silesia, in former East Prussia, and in
East Germany, had overwhelming force at its command. The Soviet Navy was
staging a show of strength in the Bay of Gdansk. But crack commando units of
the Polish Internal Security Corps (KBW) had occupied all the approaches to
Warsaw in full battle-gear and in full public view, and it was doubtful whether
the Polish General-Staff would obey Rokossowski's orders. If Krushchev
insisted on removing Gomulka, major bloodshed could not have been avoided.
The Poles were prepared to fight, and the Soviets respected Polish courage if
nothing else. There was a strong rumour that the Polish Army, if attacked, was
threatening to invade East Germany, and thus to demolish the equilibrium of
the entire Soviet presence in Central Europe. The Soviet leader would be seen to
have coerced a fraternal party, and the myth of unanimity in the Socialist camp
would be shattered for ever. So Krushchev blustered, and then relented. At one
point when he began to wax eloquent about the ingratitude of the Poles towards
the millions of Soviet war dead 'who had laid down their lives for Poland's free-
dom', he is said to have been reminded by Gomulka that 'Poles knew how to die
for their country as well as anyone'. In reality there was no basis for disagree-
ment between the two men. Both were lifelong communists, with a direct, sim-
ple style. Both, in their different ways, were seeking to abolish the grosser
absurdities of the Stalinist system. After two days' discussion Gomulka's elec-
tion was confirmed. Rokossowski and his team were to return to the USSR. The