22 NAROD
Inevitably, however, the strongest single spur to Polish national conscious-
ness derived from political frustrations. It is a basic feature of human nature that
people will develop an intense desire for whatever is denied them. They desire
it, irrespective of their material needs, or of their original intentions. In strict
contrast to the state-sponsored nationalisms of Britain and America which have
fed on a diet of confidence and prosperity, Polish national consciousness fed on
deprivation and want. Like most of the other nationalisms of Eastern Europe, it
may be seen as a negative function of the reigning tyrannies, and as such has fre-
quently assumed a militant, even a truculent air.
The politics of Polish Nationalism were conditioned from the start by the
uncompromising nature of the established order. At no time did the authorities
of the partitioning powers look with favour on the re-creation of a sovereign
and fully independent Polish state. Their original willingness to grant a measure
of autonomy to their Polish provinces declined steadily, and in Russia and
Prussia was abandoned altogether. As a result, the politically conscious Pole
was faced with a very limited choice of action. If he loyally acquiesced in the
policies of his government, he was tempted to surrender his Polish nationality in
favour of the official nationalisms of the imperial regime. By pursuing a career
in the Tsarist, Prussian, or Royal-and-Imperial service, the chances are that he
would adopt the culture and the outlook of the ruling elite, and would come to
think of himself not as a Pole but as a Russian, a German, or an Austrian. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, it was only in Austria that he could openly
profess loyalty both to the state and to the Polish cause, and even there the pos-
sibilities were strictly circumscribed. If, however, he were to give priority to
Polish aims, he was immediately confronted with a fundamental dilemma.
He had either to work with the authorities, or against them. In the context of
autocratic, authoritarian, or absolutist regimes, where pluralist political aims
were not permitted, there was no middle way: there was no concept of a 'loyal
opposition'. In the eyes of authority, one was a faithful subject, or an unfaithful
one. Ineluctably therefore, those Poles who refused to work with the authorities,
were immediately thrown into the world of subterfuge, conspiracy, and terror-
ism. They were obliged to resort to violent methods, and to pit the feeble
resources of their individual minds and muscles against the massed cohorts of
the regime with little hope of victory. These 'Insurrectionaries' were maximal-
ists by nature, risking all, and as often as not, losing all. In contrast to them,
those who chose to work with the authorities, were obliged to adopt a deferen-
tial posture towards powerful and essentially unsympathetic officials. At the
cost of much humiliation, and by risking the disgust of patriotic constituents,
they could only hope to extract concessions of a perfunctory nature, mainly in
the social, economic, or cultural fields. These 'Conciliators' were in the nature
of things minimalists. Hence, from the mid-eighteenth century to the present