THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 473things were possible; but a liberal, neutral, and popular regime was not really
on the cards.^65
The Western view of the Polish opposition was coloured by several funda-
mental misconceptions. First, it was quite unrealistic to expect that the opposi-
tion leaders would ever be encouraged to negotiate their demands with the
ruling Party on an equal basis. For the time being, in the interests of calm and
order, they were tolerated. But there could be no doubt, if ever they showed
signs of mobilizing active mass support, they would be ruthlessly crushed. Their
leaders would be arrested, or otherwise removed. Their supporters would be
attacked by a wave of police and military repression, backed up, if necessary, by
Soviet forces. Even if the Party leaders in Poland, like Dubcek in
Czechoslovakia, were to contemplate loosening the reins of monopoly power,
their Soviet masters would never permit them to do so for long.
Secondly, it was very easy to exaggerate the degree of cohesion among the var-
ious oppositionist groups. From the ideological point of view, the leaders of KOR
- Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, and the octogenarian economist, Edward
Lipinski - held eccentric left-wing or Marxist opinions which aroused little
enthusiasm among the population at large. Even the Catholic intellectuals faced
considerable difficulties. In the widespread network of Catholic Societies and
youth clubs, they possessed a much firmer organization than any of their allies. In
writers such as Kisielewski, Mazowiecki, or Cywinski, they included men who
enjoyed wide popular appeal. But they had been joined by large numbers of athe-
ist or agnostic youngsters whose political motives were entirely divorced from the
interests of the Church or of Religion. The danger was obvious. If the Catholic
intelligentsia were sufficiently infiltrated by non-Catholic dissidents, it stood to
lose both the toleration of the Party, and the protection of the Hierarchy.
Above all, there was doubt about the strength of the link between the intel-
lectual and working-class opposition. No one could be certain that hard-bitten
dockers and miners felt very enthusiastic about their patronage by professors,
journalists, and the rebellious offspring of Party functionaries. The intellectuals
may have seen the Polish workers as the salt of the earth; but the workers often
saw the intellectuals as the 'priviligentsia' - as privileged 'arm-chair' protesters.
In a crisis the workers, not the intellectuals, would have the last word.
Clearly, the Party still retained a certain space for manoeuvre. Secretary
Gierek's visit to the Vatican in December 1977, and his audience with Pope Paul
VI, represented a new gesture towards the Church. It could well have been the
intention that a period of relaxation towards Catholic dissent could be used to
mask increasing pressure on political opponents. The really urgent problem
concerned the effects of any serious act of repression which the Party felt con-
strained to order. If the dissidents were crushed by force, the revulsion at their
crushing might well provoke disaffections in other areas of Polish society. The
army's contempt for the People's Militia was well known, and their reluctance
to be used against the civilian population had been reinforced by its humiliating
role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and in the events in Poland in 1968,1970,