474 POLSKA LUDOWA
and 1976. A scenario in which the Militia lost control of a popular outburst
against repressive measures, and where the army refused to assist, thereby invit-
ing Soviet Intervention, was not beyond the bounds of imagination.
Seen in the context of the historical traditions of Polish politics, the predica-
ment of the Communist movement did not inspire confidence. If the Stalinist
period could be regarded as a brief reversion to the tradition of servile Loyalism,
the period since 1956 saw an episode of Conciliatory, or Realist politics of
unusual longevity. But now that the communist version of Conciliation was fail-
ing to bring results, there is a real possibility that the younger generation would
be drawn towards the romantic revolutionary alternative. There was plenty in
the history books, and in the legends of the Party itself, to make such a course
of action extremely appealing in conditions of extended political stagnation.
The catastrophes of 1939-47 were sufficient to deter the older generation of
Poles for the rest of their lives. But there were now millions of young adults in
Poland for whom the warnings of their elders served only to aggravate their
youthful impatience. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the forty-one
years between 1864 and 1905 formed the longest interval between revolutionary
Polish Risings. In the twentieth century, the last such Rising had occurred in
- If the regime could have maintained its course until 1985 without facing
an active challenge to its supremacy, it would have broken all records. In this
light, the crisis of 1976 might be regarded as a minor rumbling before the major
eruption which was still to come.
Yet there were few signs that anything was being done to defuse tensions. The
high level of military expenditure was hardly appropriate to a country with
chronic economic problems. The low level of productivity was hardly likely to
improve living standards. The burden of foreign debt would weigh heavily on
all future policies. The total absence of any institutional provision for chan-
nelling popular consent into the decision-making process was sure to accumu-
late popular resentments. Recurrent crises in Poland were safely predicted.
The joker in the pack — the event which few had thought possible, and certainly
no one had foreseen as a major catalyst of Polish politics - sprang onto the
world's headlines on 16 October 1978. Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, Archbishop of
Cracow, was elected Pope, and took the name of John Paul II. The event was of
capital importance for the religious, spiritual, and political life of the whole
world. But it had very particular and powerful repercussions for his native land.
For the Polish Pope effortlessly undermined the premises on which the post-war
order in Poland had been built. One premise had been that the Communist
regime, having a full range of coercive and persuasive instruments to hand,
would build a new so-called Socialist society, where the old patriotic and reli-
gious loyalties would be abandoned. Another had been, if the Soviet-based
regime were to be seriously challenged, that it would defend 'the gains of
Socialism' with irresistible force.
The Pope's first visit to Poland in June 1979 was awaited with a heady mix-