25
WOLNOSC:
Freedom Regained 1990-2000
The sudden, catastrophic, and peaceful collapse of an empire was something
that Europe had never known. The colonial empires of the West European pow-
ers had disintegrated after 1945 amidst a greater or lesser degree of violence. But
the great empires that had occupied large parts of European territory had usu-
ally fallen apart amidst the strains of war. The French Empire of Napoleon had
collapsed in 1815 after forty major battles. The Russian Empire in 1917, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German Empire in 1918, had crumbled dur-
ing the First World War. The Nazi Empire had fought on until totally destroyed
in 1945. But the Soviet Empire died on its feet, like some great dinosaur that was
no longer fit for life,
Poland belonged to the outermost ring of satellite states that had been over-
run by the Soviet Army in 1944-5. It had always possessed more room for
manoeuvre than the inner ring of countries like the Baltic States or like Ukraine,
which had been conquered by the Red Army in 1919-21 and which had been
corralled into the Soviet Union in 1923. It was in a far more favourable position
than the autonomous republics, such as Chechnya or Tatarstan, which Russians
had been told were 'theirs'. (In Polish eyes, the terrible fate of Chechnya
attracted much sympathy, because it reminded them of what might well have
happened to Poland in other, less fortunate circumstances.)
Yet Poland had many special problems. It was by far the largest of the Soviet
satellites and, from Moscow's viewpoint, the least expendable. It established its
freedom in 1990 at a juncture when the USSR was still intact, and when
Gorbachev alone barred the possibility of Muscovite retribution. Moreover, for
historical reasons, it was rightly suspected of pro-Western tendencies, and,
because of SOLIDARITY and the Polish Pope, was seen by hardliners as a gen-
eral menace. On the other hand, given a headstart by the Round Table Talks
and the Balcerowicz Plan, Poland had the best chance of making a rapid transi-
tion to an effective new system. There was a ready-made alternative elite. There
were very few ideologically committed Communists prepared to fight a rear-
guard action. There was a large cohort of well-educated young people ready to
take risks and initiatives. There was a lot of support from large Polish commu-
nities abroad, especially in the USA; and there were encouraging attitudes
among Poland's Western neighbours, especially Germany.
The first vital test of Poland's newfound independence occurred early in 1991,
when the Soviet Government surprisingly proposed a relaunch of the old