512 WOLNOSC
In this way, an important opportunity was missed. A serious operation had
descended into fiasco. The guilty ran free. The body politick was never cleansed,
even symbolically. And reconciliation of the contending camps occurred in
haphazard fashion, without the necessary, public establishment of democratic
criteria.
Much delay was also experienced in the task of constructing a properly demo-
cratic Constitution. The Third Republic had to operate for eight years in a legal
framework designed for completely different circumstances. The laws of the
PRL lacked legitimacy. But they could not be replaced overnight. In fact, seven
years passed before the necessary result was achieved. One step was taken in
1992 with the so-called Little Constitution, which regulated electoral proce-
dures. A second step was taken in 1995 with the appointment of a parliamentary
Constitutional Commission, which reported two years later. The final constitu-
tional bill became a bone of considerable contention, uniting the SLD and the
Unia against right-wing groups, which thought it both 'anti-national' and 'anti-
Christian'. In the eyes of the bishops, the Constitution lacked 'a soul'. But it was
passed, and confirmed by a poorly frequented referendum. It reduced the pow-
ers of the President as practised since 1989 and strengthened the Sejm and the
Premier. It de-politicized both the army and the judiciary. Most importantly, it
set up a principled, parliamentary democracy.
A degree of political turbulence was inevitable. But anxieties were contained
by a plethora of presidential, parliamentary, senatorial, and local elections and
by frequent changes of government. No one faction obtained a decisive advan-
tage; and a rather cynical, chaotic brand of democracy was the only clear win-
ner. As correctly foreseen by a distinguished sociologist, the political pendulum
had to swing 'once in the liberal and once in the social direction'. 'The liberal
direction... involves the jump-start of economies', wrote Ralf Dahrendorf.
'Opposition is bound to arise and will be about the social cost of economic
growth.' The defining moment arrived in November 1995 with the second pres-
idential election. Lech Walesa, sometime hero of the nation, had not lived up to
expectations. A born populist and skilled dissident, he did not master the arts of
high office, presiding for five years in an unpredictable, high-handed, and occa-
sionally petty manner. He set up a personal court of dubious advisers in which,
rightly or wrongly, his chauffeur and his confessor were seen to be more influen-
tial than his ministers; and he lost the confidence of his former SOLIDARITY
colleagues. When the test of his leadership came, therefore, the SOLIDARITY
vote was split between Waifsa and Kuron, and both were overtaken by the ex-
Communist, Aleksander Kwasniewski, who won the second round by 52 per
cent to 48 per cent. At first sight, the outcome was shocking. The country which
had led the struggle against Communism had fallen into the hands of a politician
whose rise had begun inside the Communist camp. And yet, on reflection, the
result proved healthy enough. The voting had been fairly contested. The new
President was competent and conciliatory. Having accepted Poland's strategic
path leading towards membership of NATO and of the European Union, he was