THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN NATION 45By the turn of the twentieth century, Polish independence looked as much a
mirage as ever. In Germany and Russia, the Polish provinces were ruled from
the centre, and played only a marginal role in policy-making. No nationalist
politician held a responsible position in imperial counsels. In Austria, where
Galicia had enjoyed political and cultural autonomy since 1868-75, the Poles
formed one of the strongest pillars of the Habsburg regime. They gave little
thought to all-Polish, as opposed to Galician interests, and even less to the
proposition that they should combine with their compatriots in Germany and
Russia. The high degree of co-ordination between the police forces of the three
Empires, assiduously engaged in combating nationalist movements, was never
matched by the attempts at co-ordination among the multifarious Polish parties
of the three Partitions.^47 On the diplomatic front, the Polish Question had long
since disappeared from the active agenda of the powers. The impunity with
which the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna were destroyed in the first half of
the nineteenth century, had blunted the edge of foreign concern. By now, most
statesmen had come to regard the Poles as just another minority, whose
demands for fair treatment could not include the right to sovereignty. In a world
of full-blown imperialism, they did not question the benefits of German or
Russian rule in Poland, any more than those of their own rule in Ireland, Egypt,
Algeria, or Panama. The diplomatic combinations of the last fifty years were
consistently unfavourable. In the Bismarckian Era, the alliance of Prussia and
Russia involved a close understanding on the suppression of Polish matters, and
precluded all external interference. In 1872, it was enhanced by the accession of
Austria—Hungary to the Dreikaiserbund (The Three Emperors' League). The
fall of Bismarck, and the subsequent realignment of the Powers left certain room
for manoeuvre, especially during the Russo-Japanese War and the revolutionary
years of 1905—6. But the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1893 neutralized one of the
two western powers who might have exploited the Polish issue; whilst the
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 removed the other. To all intents and pur-
poses, the Polish Question was dead.
Polish national consciousness was itself in a state of disarray. In Germany, the
relative position of the Poles was much weaker than in the Kingdom of Prussia.
It is true that their numbers were holding up in Pomerania and Posnania. They
successfully resisted the Kulturkampf of the 1870s and the activities of the
Prussian Land Commission, 1886-1913. Yet the relentless pressures of industri-
alization, of increasing social mobility, and of the virtual German monopoly in
higher education took a heavy toll. The Polish element was in danger of relaps-
ing into a residual, rural community. Posen alone, with its excellent educational
institutions and its pool of skilled Polish labour was the one place which stood
to keep up with the times and stay Polish. In Silesia, second only to the Ruhr in
industrial output, Germanization proceeded apace. Unlike the Posnanians, the
indigenous population had no memories of former connections with the Polish