THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN NATION 55Russian Empire, the ally of the British Empire in two World Wars, whilst oppos-
ing the formation of an 'imperialist' Polish state in anything but its most abbre-
viated form. Yet the name-calling did not stop there. Lithuanians,
Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and Czechs were all destined to join the common
chorus against Polish Imperialism. For their part, the Polish imperialists decried
'Lithuanian Imperialism' in greater Lithuania, 'Ukrainian Imperialism' in
Galicia, and 'Czech Imperialism' in Silesia. Eventually, the Poles took up with
the Lithuanians and Ukrainians to denounce the advent of 'Byelorussian
Imperialism' in Podlasie and Polesie. (It is not known whether Polesian imperi-
alists ever recognized the mortal threat posed by the Jewish imperialists of
Pinsk.) The ultimate point was reached at a meeting in the Kremlin on 13
October 1944, when Jozef Stalin, of all people, accused the representative of the
Polish Govemment-in-Exile, Stanislaw Mikotajczyk, of being 'an imperialist'.
'Imperialism' had long since degenerated into an emotive catch-phrase, and
everyone used it as they thought fit.
The divisive effects of Nationalism did not go unnoticed, of course, and there
were many Polish leaders who tried to counteract them, Federalist ideas were
especially strong in Pitsudski's camp, and found clear expression in the writings
of Leon Wasilewski (1870-1936), editor of the theoretical socialist journal
Przedswit (First Light) and author of Litwa i Biatorus (Lithuania and
Byelorussia, 1912.) and of Ukrainska sprawa narodowa (The Ukrainian
National Cause, 1925). Whilst respecting the right of every nation to control its
own destiny, Poles of this persuasion argued that some form of multi-national
federation was essential in Eastern Europe, if the overwhelming military man-
power and superior technical resources of the great empires were to be success-
fully opposed. The survival of all oppressed nations of the region demanded a
measure of voluntary self-restraint from each and every one. These ideas are not
yet dead, even today. The trouble was that the federalists were attacked not only
by their more chauvinist compatriots at home, who charged them with selling
Poland's birthright to foreigners, but also by their prospective Lithuanian,
Byelorussian, and Ukrainian partners, who understandably mistook the modern
federalist ideal for a revamped version of the old Polish Rzeczpospolita.
Furthermore, it was a fact of political geography that the most uncompromising
representatives of Polish Nationalism, namely Roman Dmowski and his
National Democrats, drew their most fervent support from those cities, such as
Poznari, Wilno, and Lwow, where compromise on the national issue would
have been most desirable. To people unnerved by the constant anti-Polish snip-
ing of local nationalist rivals, Dmowski's concept of Incorporation, which
envisaged the future integration of all border areas into a completely unitary
Polish state, proved much more attractive than Pilsudski's opposing concept of
Federation. Moderation was most lacking in those places where it was most
required. It is interesting to note, for instance, that Pitsudski probably counted
fewer supporters among the Poles of his native Wilno, than among the city's
Jews. For a man who laid great store by the Polish traditions of generosity and