previously held back, out of hostile artillery range. In addition, the operational-level
movement of troops by the lateral rail lines behind the front guaranteed that any
menacing breach would soon be sealed by fresh forces.
Overall, by 191 8 everyone had learnt how to wage modern warfare, albeit in styles
which best suited individual national contexts. Combined-arms warfare was understood
and practised. At least, it was practised when the means were available and the troops
and their leaders were properly trained, which was by no means always the case. The
military experience of 191 8 , with its succession of five mighty German offensives,
followed by the drumroll of Allied counter-offensives which continued into November,
demonstrated beyond any room for doubt that there was only one way to win the war.
Daring operational manoeuvre, heroic and skilful infantry tactics and in general even an
excellence in the conduct of combined-arms warfare depending critically on the artillery,
tanks and air power could not offer a short cut to victory. The war could be won only
by attrition. The belligerents were too powerful and too competent to be defeated by
anything other than exhaustion.
Nothing has been said thus far about the introduction of poison gas into warfare. This
secret weapon, first revealed at Ypres by the Germans in April 1915, initially was
effective in panicking unprepared troops. But soldiers soon learnt how to minimize the
damage from gas attacks, and specialized protective equipment was issued. Gas, which
became progressively more deadly from 1915 to 191 8 , came to be employed on a large
scale by both sides. Although it was not as lethal as conventional high explosives, when
gas was delivered precisely by the artillery it was an especially fearsome weapon because
of the horrific character of the injuries it caused (e.g., lung damage, blindness, blistering).
But its effect on warfare was simply to add to the horror and reinforce the difficulties of
tactical combat. It was not a wonder weapon that could unlock the enemy’s defences on
the Western Front.
Maritime matters have also been conspicuous by their absence from this analysis. In
military terms this neglect has been commanded by a historical record that showed little
naval action that had direct significance for the course and outcome of the war. To repeat,
the war was decided, and could only be decided, on land on the Western Front. However,
if one approaches the question of the maritime contribution to the history of the war
strategically, as one must, it is plain to see just how significant British maritime command
was for the outcome. The Royal Navy checkmated and distantly blockaded Germany’s
short-range High Seas Fleet, while in 1917–1 8 it defeated the U-boat menace by its
implementation of a convoy system. Bear in mind that sea power exerts its influence
strategically and slowly upon the land, the geography of decision. By commanding the
seas around Europe, the Royal Navy enabled the Allies to win a long war of attrition,
always assuming that the Allied armies were militarily effective. World War I was a war
of competing resources. Maritime command meant that the Allies could draw upon
the assets of the whole world reachable by sea. Germany suffered in two fundamental
ways. On the one hand, it was deprived of access to the raw materials from overseas
which it needed desperately. To cite but four vital items, Germany was cut off from
supplies essential to the making of gunpowder, potentially a fatal bottleneck in a war
economy: ‘cotton from the United States; camphor from Japan; pyrites from Spain; and
saltpetre from Chile’ (Strachan, 2001: 1025). On the other hand, enjoying unrestricted
maritime access, the Allies could not exhaust the material basis for their war-making, at
94 War, peace and international relations