Preface
I have long been convinced that students of strategic studies know too little history,
while students of history and international relations are inclined to short-change the
strategic dimension to their subjects. This book attempts to provide a coherent
narrative and analysis of the past two centuries, keyed to the strategic perspective.
A textbook should explain what happened, not advance the author’s beliefs. Truth
and error should be accorded equal space by the author, so that students can judge
for themselves where the balance of probability lies. All I can say in self-defence is
that I have tried earnestly to be neutral on the more controversial topics, but the
assertive habits of a professional lifetime cannot easily be set aside. The result is a
compromise. My personal opinion probably intrudes into this work more than it
should. But it appears less than I would have liked.
This book has benefited greatly from what I have learnt teaching the course on
which it is based, both in Britain and in the United States. I know from experience –
the students’ experience, that is – that this melding of modern history, international
relations and strategic studies works well. I am in the debt of my students at the
University of Reading in Britain and at Missouri State University in Washington, DC.
For most of my career I have been a professional defence analyst and theorist, to
which activity of recent years I have added university teaching. It follows that I had
need of some expert help in preparing this work, since textbook writing requires a
skill set all its own. My principal debt is to the excellent Andrew Humphrys, my
editor at Routledge/Taylor and Francis. I have been amazed by his patience with an
opinionated strategist who does not count brevity among his virtues. Andrew’s advice
invariably has been sound, even though I tried to resist some of it initially. Also I have
learnt a lot from friends who truly are artists in the writing and illustrating of
textbooks. Most especially, I must thank Jeremy Black, the extraordinary quantity of
whose output is matched only by its high quality. Jeremy probably will not approve
of my liking for a ‘master narrative’, but he may be won around when he realizes that
that narrative is only ‘strategic history’ and not a particular storyline. In addition, I
would like to thank my friend John Baylis, now at the University of Wales, Swansea,
a scholar whose superior textbooking talents are approaching legendary status.
This book has been possible only because of the support I have received from the
School of Sociology, Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading
