of effort. So, 1942 turned out to be something of an operational replay of 1941. A
still mighty German Army attempted to accomplish too much, in too many divergent
directions, for its strength. The strategic difference was that by late 1942 the Russian
enemy had recovered its breath, learnt much about the modern trade of warfare from its
earlier mistakes and from close study of German practice, and had mobilized on a scale
unanticipated by the Germans. In short, the strategic context was growing ever less
permissive of German strategic and operational errors.
Also in 1942, from a necessarily slow beginning, the United States was establishing
what must become a major land and air presence in the European theatre; the Italo-
German situation in North Africa proceeded from bad to worse; Germany at home was
now under serious aerial bombardment; and its Japanese ally had lost the strategic
initiative with its defeat at Midway on 4–6 June. But at the end of 1942 Germany still
remained formidable. Its troops stood near the Volga, though admittedly they were
encircled. The Luftwaffe, though sorely weakened by its heroic efforts to resupply the
Sixth Army at Stalingrad, was still very much in business. And the Kriegsmarine, the
U-boat arm in particular, had had a strategically excellent year for Germany: 1942 was
its second ‘happy time’, with 1940 having been the first. But the tide of war was turning,
and possibly might have turned already. Irrespective of whether that fact was fully
recognized in Berlin, 1943 was to witness Germany’s final throw of the dice in the hope
of shifting the military momentum on the Eastern Front.
1943: the final throw and reversal
Strategically appraised, 1943 was a year of preparation for the reckoning that would come
due in 1944. The latter year saw the collapse of Germany’s strategic position on all fronts
except, perhaps, the Italian. In 1943, Hitler assembled every available new Panther and
Tiger tank in order to deliver crushing pincer blows to a Red Army that had suffered more
than a million casualties in the Stalingrad campaign. In fact, he delayed the offensive,
codenamed Citadel, by at least six weeks to allow more time for new tank deliveries. The
Red Army was temporarily exhausted. With much operational dexterity, and a new
armoured force, the Germans aspired to win a great victory. There was a large bulge in
the Soviet line around the city of Kursk which seemed to beg to be pinched off by com-
plementary assaults from north and south. Given Soviet spies, poor German operational
security and the unmistakeable attraction of the salient, it is scarcely surprising that the
Russians had detailed foreknowledge of the Kursk offensive. They prepared defences in
great depth, including no fewer than six defensive belts and massed armoured reserves to
meet such panzers as managed to survive the minefields, anti-tank artillery and tank-
destroyer aircraft. Despite initial penetrations, the German assault failed at a lethal cost
in irreplaceable armour and experienced tank crews and panzer grenadiers. Kursk was
the greatest tank-to-tank battle in history. Germany could wage it only once. The Germans
committed 3,155 tanks – of which they lost 3,000 – 9,960 pieces of artillery and 435,000
soldiers; the Soviets defended with 3,275 tanks, 13,013 artillery pieces and a million men,
plus large reserves. Hitler saved face by using the Anglo-American landing in Sicily on
9–10 July as an expedient excuse for calling off the offensive, but it had already failed.
Although Stalingrad was a very significant defeat – twenty-two German divisions were
destroyed – and a huge blow to German prestige, Kursk was the true military turning
136 War, peace and international relations