and Asia–Pacific determined that the former ultimately would have to be brought down
by continental warfare. The latter, by contrast, might succumb primarily either to conti-
nental pressure exercised in and from China or to maritime and maritime–air assault; or,
indeed, it might fall to both. In practice, the Chinese continental road to the Japanese
Home Islands proved impracticable, for a mixture of geographical, political, logistical
and military reasons. Although the wars in Europe and Asia–Pacific were intimately
linked politically, strategically and certainly logistically (at least they were for one
belligerent – the United States), it is an easy matter to exaggerate the connections. These
were two distinct wars. To say that is to risk overstatement, but it is one that registers a
vital truth. The Grand Alliance did not wage a global war against the Axis powers, if only
because those powers did not themselves wage a global war.
It is true that the war in Europe was global in that the British Empire was truly
global, and it mobilized its global assets to fight, just as it had in World War I. Also, on
22 June 1941, Germany attacked a country, the Soviet Union, that was both a European
and an Asian power, though the latter status rested logistically on the thin ribbon of steel
of the single-track trans-Siberian railway. Trueglobality to conflict from 1941 to 1945
was therefore conferred uniquely by the United States. Washington alone played major
roles in both wars, and it was alone in having the strategic discretion to choose to swing
its mobilized resources more in favour of one contest than the other. All the other
belligerents lacked such freedom of strategic choice.
It is possible that the Asia–Pacific war might have had a determinative effect upon the
war in Europe. There could have been a genuinely global war. But, fortunately, that did
not occur because Berlin and Tokyo did not conduct their statecraft, or wage their wars,
with an enlightened view to helping themselves by helping each other. They did not
develop, or even seriously consider developing, a coordinated strategy in pursuit of
mutually agreed policy goals.
Two points serve to illustrate the potential of the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940,
the formal basis for the German–Japanese Alliance (Italy was the third member). First,
the Soviet Union was able to save Moscow in December 1941 by transferring more than
half of its Siberian divisions from the Far East, where they had been guarding against
attack by Japan’s Kwantung Army. It is at least possible that had Japan attacked the Soviet
Union in the East, the Germans might have secured a decisive victory at Moscow. (Earlier
in the year, the option of joining the Germans in the attack on Russia had found some
articulate supporters in Tokyo.) Second, unlike Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan conducted
serious debates over policy and strategy. It was reasonably obvious to the leaders in Tokyo
that Japan could win its war only if Germany won, too. If Germany were to lose, it would
only be a matter of time before the Allies massed their forces to conclude strategic
business in Asia–Pacific. In practice, it is little short of amazing to realize just how
minimal was the content of the Axis partnership because, in theory, the German–
Japanese Axis had formidable strategic potential.
The Japanese bid for empire
From the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until nemesis in August 1945, a modern-
izing Imperial Japan strove to become the dominant power in East Asia. Primarily, this
drive entailed a bid for continental imperium, an effort focused overwhelmingly on
World War II in Asia–Pacific, I 159