Soviet Union – which remained a distinct possibility until quite late in 1942, and feasible
even in 1943 – and as a consequence dominate Europe, it was reasoned in Tokyo to be
improbable that Washington would be willing to conduct a total war in the Pacific.
This Japanese theory of victory was as weak as it sounds in the brief outline above. It
might have had some small merit in the event of a German victory, but that, of course,
was out of Tokyo’s hands to control. And, if anything, Tokyo had hurt its own strategic
prospects by declining to join in the assault on the Soviet Union.
Four erroneous Japanese assumptions foredoomed the Japanese bid for expanded
empire. First, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a cultural mistake of the first order.
Regardless of its substantial tactical success, it so incensed the American public that no
US government could accept any outcome short of virtually total, unconditional Japanese
surrender. (The only condition that the United States did accept, at the last minute,
was preservation of the symbolic role of the Emperor.) It is almost a law of strategy that
one must not wage war in such a way as to foreclose upon the kind of political outcome
that is desired. Since Japan sought to wage a limited war for limited, albeit territorially
extravagant, gains, it was not wise strategy to open proceedings with tactical actions
which would drive the materially superior enemy to seek total revenge.
Second, Germany did not defeat the Soviet Union. This had not quite been an
assumption behind Japanese policy, at least not for long beyond June–July 1941, but it
was a far more vital necessity for the security of the Japanese Empire than Tokyo
appeared to recognize.
Third, Japan was well advised by military and industrial professionals who believed
that they understood the depth of America’s war-making potential. But few, if any, of
them appreciated that the United States would prove strong enough to mobilize on a scale
adequate to wage a two-ocean war, simultaneously.
Fourth and finally, the Japanese strategy for imperial defence was fundamentally
flawed because it could be only as robust as the military balance that supported it. The
strength of the fortifications and garrisons on geographically isolated atolls and islands
did not really matter strategically; their protection had to be systemic, or it was nothing.
Japan’s Pacific island barriers comprised a network held together, and indeed to be
defended directly, by the maritime–air strength of the Imperial Navy employed in
conjunction with local, land-based air power. If the Imperial Japanese Navy was too weak
to contest an American advance, then the island garrisons were simply de factoPOW
camps. The United States could pick and choose which islands it would assault and which
it would ignore. Many of the necessary amphibious assaults would prove hugely expen-
sive in casualties, but Japanese defeat, island by island, was as inevitable as the bravery
shown by the defenders was strategically irrelevant and culturally faithful.
As Japanese military leaders had predicted, the strategic initiative was theirs for five
months. But two critical naval–air battles in May and June 1942 effectively marked the
end of the short period wherein Japan controlled the character and geostrategic direction
of the war. As noted already, at the Coral Sea on 7–8 May the US Navy ambushed the
Japanese invasion fleet bound for Port Moresby. Aside from the significant tactical fact
that the Coral Sea was the first sea battle wherein the combatants’ ships were always out
of sight of each other, the indecisive tactical outcome was sufficient to thwart the Japanese
invasion plan. Port Moresby was the last stop before Port Darwin in Australia’s sparsely
populated Northern Territory.
World War II in Asia–Pacific, II 171