commentators have disdainfully termed a strategy of ‘indecisive encirclement’. However,
the American liking for a rapid, direct approach to Hitler’s Fortress Europe was also a
formula all but guaranteed to produce military disaster. America’s inclination towards
haste in Europe needed to be disciplined by a realistic appreciation of the continuing
strengths of the Wehrmacht. Fortunately, in 1942 and 1943 the United States was the
junior partner in the Anglo-American Alliance. Therefore, it was in no position to insist
that the invasion of France must be undertaken immediately. Any such venture would
have had to be carried out largely by British and Canadian troops, not American.
Needless to say, the American public mood in 1941–2, and the country’s strategic
preferences, were very far removed from Japan’s pre-war expectations. Such is the price
of cultural ignorance and a lack of imagination. The Pearl Harbor attack was an assault
on American honour, as well as on its battle fleet. And when honour has been besmirched,
the offended party is not likely to be interested in the conduct of a strictly limited conflict.
It is worth noting that the racially homogeneous Japanese, in common with their German
nominal ally, had scant respect for Americans as members of a polyglot society. In
contrast, German and Japanese soldiers regarded themselves as racially privileged
warriors in a sacred cause. It was not a large leap of prejudice for them to see their
American opponents as inherently inferior soldiers because of their racially varied
ancestry.
The paths taken by what passed for US strategy in the war against Japan illustrate a
number of enduring themes in strategic history. To be specific: history has a dynamic all
its own that defies close management and control. Also, contingency and surprise may
compel a radical change of course. Furthermore, opportunity can beckon as the strategic
context changes. Finally, military events will have a momentum all their own. It is all
very well to agree to defeat Germany first, but if Americans are heavily committed
operationally and tactically in the Pacific, there must be a military logic to their behaviour
and to its consequences which high policy will be almost impotent to frustrate for the
sake of a general principle.
Despite the Germany First policy (from which Roosevelt never deviated), the course
of events in the Pacific drew the United States more deeply, and sooner, into the war
against Japan than had been expected. This was the result of public anger over Pearl
Harbor and, even more, because of American surprise at the success and speed of the
Japanese wave of conquest. It was recognized that unless the Japanese rampage were
slowed and stopped, it could pose an unduly formidable strategic challenge to meet in
years to come. There was thus an urgent need to limit the damage. Where would the
Japanese halt?
The American counter-attack
The balance of military power in the Central Pacific, at least, was altered radically
(though it was certainly not reversed) by the surprising American victory at Midway in
June 1942. In fact, the US Navy probably inflicted even more damage upon the Japanese
than it appreciated at the time by wiping out the core of Japan’s elite naval aviators. For
historical perspective, it should be noted that although there were dozens of minor
engagements between the two navies from 1942 to 1945, there were really only three
grand clashes. One can speculate as to why that was the case, but the most plausible
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