Conclusion
Strategically viewed, the war in Asia–Pacific revealed a familiar weakness in state-
craft on the part of Japan. In common with the belligerents in World War I, Japan was
committed to a policy that was not achievable. Its strategic choices, operational dexterity
and tactical skills were beside the point. They could not deliver victory against a
militarily competent United States. The latter was undefeatable by Japan, as Tokyo
180 War, peace and international relations
- The Asia–Pacific War was cross-cultural and was marked by deep racial and
cultural antipathies on both sides. This made for extreme brutality in the
fighting, and in the treatment of prisoners and enemy civilians. - Both Japan and the United States transformed the ways their navies fought,
privileging carrier task forces, although faith in the guns of the battle line did
not entirely die, especially in the Imperial Japanese Navy. - This war demonstrated almost perfectly the flexibility of sea power.
- Inter-service rivalries and suspicions on both sides hindered and often
prevented unity of command and concentration of effort. To a marked degree,
the US Navy and Marine Corps, the Army and the Army Air Force waged
separate wars. As for the Japanese, they never really possessed or pursued a
coherent joint war plan embracing the Army and the Navy. - The United States flouted the principle of war which requires concentration of
effort. The two-vector assault upon the Japanese Empire, by MacArthur from
the South West Pacific and by Nimitz from the east, was a division of effort.
However, it was a division that the United States could afford. - The bigger battalions of the United States increased in size as the war pro-
gressed, just as the Japanese had anticipated. With growing quantity matched
by a high quality of combat, planning and logistical skills, the outcome of the
fighting was not in doubt. - Intelligence, especially code-breaking, played a vital role.
- Warfare in Asia–Pacific was as much, if not more, a struggle against nature as
against the human enemy. US forces regularly suffered more from disease and
hardship in the field than they did from enemy fire. - Time was an American asset. This most unforgiving of strategy’s dimensions
was always running against the Japanese. They could not escape from a
relatively long war in which they were increasingly overmatched in everything
except courage. - Despite the American affection for technology, especially heavy firepower, and
notwithstanding the fact that this was a war waged by maritime manoeuvre on
a monumental scale, there was a great deal of island combat that was up close
and very personal. The sharp end of this war was very sharp indeed. There are
few places to hide on a beach or a small island. - Strategically assessed, the Asia–Pacific War was an American war. Only the
United States had the military means, and the economy to produce those
means, to deny Japan hegemony over East Asia and the Western Pacific.