War, Peace, and International Relations. An Introduction to Strategic History

(John Hannent) #1

always recognized, and would never acquiesce in Japanese establishment by force of
arms its notion of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. In other words, Japanese
high policy placed demands upon its armed forces that could not possibly be met. The
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, whatever its tactical success, was a strategic disaster.
It so offended the American public that Japan was denied even the remote possibility of
being allowed to wage the only kind of war it might conclude with advantage: a limited
struggle for limited ends.
Just as Japanese policy set unattainable goals – or, more precisely, unsustainable ones



  • so its military strategy was thoroughly unsound, given the dynamic military context.
    Japan created a network of island fortresses in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines and
    Marianas, intended to protect the main ocean approach from across the Pacific to Japan
    itself. But these defences in depth could be effective only in the context of their being
    supported by a strength in naval–air power that would be at least competitive with the
    strength of the US Navy. Alas, by late 1943 and thenceforth, the Imperial Japanese Navy,
    though still formidable, became less and less competitive with a US Navy that demon-
    strated skill in fighting at least as impressive as its sheer size.
    Individuals matter. From October 1941 until July 1944, General Tojo Hideki was the
    dominant war leader of Imperial Japan. He was both Prime Minister and Minister of
    War. But unlike the Third Reich, Tojo’s Japan was not a dictatorship. He had to contend
    with powerful interest groups in the Army and the Navy. Also, although the Emperor’s
    role was more symbolic than substantive, it had the potential to serve as the focus for
    effective opposition. Events in August 1945 were to prove just how useful the Emperor
    could be when a government is uncertain what to do in a moment of national crisis.
    Even a Bismarck would have found it close to impossible to steer the Japanese ship of
    state safely towards its regionally hegemonic goal, and Tojo was no Bismarck. He gave
    every impression of presiding over a losing war, while utterly bereft of ideas as to how
    Japan’s strategic fortunes might be improved. Japan’s civilian leaders, though Prime
    Minister Tojo was a career soldier, failed abysmally in their duty to conduct an ‘unequal
    dialogue’ on strategy with their subordinate military leaders (Cohen, 2002). The Navy
    had been permitted to open proceedings on 7 December 1941 with its ill-conceived
    blow to American honour. As Japanese military fortunes worsened markedly through late
    1943 and the first half of 1944, concluding with the defeat off Saipan in the Marianas,
    Tokyo simply did not know what to do. More to the point, there was no one in Tokyo in
    authority with the imagination, skill and ruthlessness to demand and secure a change in
    policy or strategy. Tojo resigned as Prime Minister following the humiliation of defeat
    at Saipan, but his departure did not herald any improvement in Japanese statecraft or
    strategy.
    After defeat at Saipan in June 1944, Japan was in very much the same situation as its
    German nominal ally had been following the defeat at Kursk in July 1943. Both countries
    ceased to function by direction from purposeful strategy. When the Imperial Japanese
    Navy lost its real striking power, which is to say its carrier aviation, especially the
    experienced pilots, it could no longer claim to be fighting for any operational objec-
    tives or strategic purpose. Courage, sometimes skill, and American mistakes enabled
    the Japanese armed forces thereafter to exact a heavy toll upon their enemy, but to what
    end? In 1944–5, Japan lacked a theory of victory, even its original, thoroughly uncon-
    vincing one.


World War II in Asia–Pacific, II 181
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