Little has been said thus far of those analytically convenient concepts, the ‘decisive
battle’, or event, and the ‘turning point’. It is an elementary matter to identify several
significant military events in the Asia–Pacific War: Midway, of course; the Guadalcanal
campaign, certainly; and assuredly the American victory at Saipan. But none of those
encounters, the brief and the protracted, should be regarded as decisive or as turning
points. An earlier chapter noted the common belief that there were no decisive battles in
World War I. The same can be said for the Asia–Pacific War, albeit for a different reason.
In 1914–18, victory was achieved piecemeal, by attrition. In 1941–5, although the
geography of the war compelled maritime and amphibious manoeuvre on the grandest of
scales, at the tip of the spears of the belligerents men died and machines were destroyed.
As Napoleon did, the US Navy manoeuvred in order to fight with maximum advantage.
As has been stated many times, one is reluctant to claim that the outcome of a war is
inevitable. Did not Clausewitz insist that ‘war is the realm of chance’? But strategic
history is not a lottery. If a country chooses to fight when its strategic context offers no
realistic prospect of eventual success, as did Japan in 1941, the outcomes of particular
battles are unlikely to signify much for very long. The Asia–Pacific War of 1941–5 was
a conflict that Imperial Japan was alwaysgoing to lose. It remains a cultural and strategic
puzzle why so many Japanese military and political leaders endorsed the decision to go
to war in 1941 while knowing that fact.
Questions
- How plausible do you find the Japanese theory of victory?
- Could Japan have expanded in South East Asia without attacking the United
States? - What were the advantages and disadvantages of the American strategic options
for the conduct of its war against Japan? - How did warfare in the Asia–Pacific theatre differ from warfare in Europe?
182 War, peace and international relations
Key points
- Japan faced a brutal choice: fight or abandon its fifty-year drive for empire and
great power status. - Japan was obliged to strike at US air and naval forces because they posed the
only credible threat to the establishment of an expanded empire in South East
Asia. - Japan’s theory of imperial defence was to fortify a network of island bases,
supported by the mobile strength of the Navy. - Japan’s theory of victory in a limited war held that a well-defended maritime
perimeter would deter the United States from undertaking the difficult and
expensive task of reconquest. - Japan never regained the strategic initiative after its defeat at Midway in June
1942. - This was a war that Japan could not win.