Or was the strategic history of the 1990s actually more complicated than a simple,
albeit elemental, shift in the character of war? And even if war in that decade was
transformed from its erstwhile Industrial Age, interstate form into a phenomenon marked
pre-eminently by intra-societal struggle and irregular combat, was that perceived trans-
formation to be permanent or merely transient? The clearest, least ambiguous claim for
the transformation of war has been advanced by Rupert Smith, who was cited earlier in
connection with the sad story of UN ineffectiveness in Bosnia. He begins The Utility of
Fo rc ewith an uncompromising claim, and is worth quoting at some length:
War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all round
the world – most noticeably, but not only, in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the Palestinian territories – and states still have armed
forces which they use as a symbol of power. None the less, war as cognitively known
to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as
a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer
exists...
It is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred:
from armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic confrontation
between a range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and using different types
of weapons, often improvised. The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war.
The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people.
(Smith, 2005: 1, 3)General Smith is justified in the emphasis he places upon irregular warfare among non-
state entities. But, one should ask, is such warfare new? And is it plausible to claim that
the paradigm of ‘war amongst the people’, as the general himself witnessed in Ireland,
Bosnia and elsewhere, has superseded interstate war? These are questions with profound
practical implications for the defence policies, strategies and force postures of states.
As has been emphasized, the 1990s were a bloody decade. Warfare was frequent and
widespread in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasian former republics of the USSR, South
Asia, the Middle East and, most abominably of all, sub-Saharan Africa (plus Algeria).
What follows is a discussion of three of the highest, or perhaps lowest, points in the all-
too-ample strategic history of the post-Cold War decade.
The First Gulf War, 1991: America triumphant
With some reluctance, and preceded by a lively domestic political debate, the United
States assembled and led a global coalition for the UN-blessed mission of ejecting Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. With the Soviet Union in its political death throes, and in the context
of clear-cut Iraqi aggression, the only real issue proved to be how extensive a victory the
coalition desired. For reasons of anticipated Arab sensibilities, the limited nature of
the UN licence (it did not include regime change) and anxiety over the difficulties of
urban combat and subsequent control, the United States was content with the simple
liberation of Kuwait and the imposition of serious losses upon the Iraqi armed forces.
Somewhat after the fashion of British reasoning in 1814–15 and 1919 towards France
and Germany, respectively, American policy-makers did not want a totally prostrate Iraq
228 War, peace and international relations