In other words, an insurgency can grow from a period of preparation with political
agitation, some guerrilla activity, and terrorism; through a period of intense guerrilla
warfare and some mobile (conventional) operations – a time of rough strategic balance,
or even stalemate; to a period of offensive conventional operations. In the context of
steady strategic direction and political purpose, tactical and operational flexibility is the
hallmark of a competently conducted insurgency.
Just as guerrilla warfare is no more than an expedient tactical means to a political
end, so is terrorism. Both forms of irregular warfare are employed strictly for their
strategic effect. If either begins to yield negative returns, it must be halted. For example,
guerrilla activity may attract an official response that bears down heavily on local people,
and many of those people might blame the guerrillas rather than the government for
their misfortune. With respect to terrorism, rather than delegitimizing the government
for its evident inability to protect innocent citizens, terrorist outrages against blameless
civilians can provoke feelings of moral revulsion at the callous brutality of the terrorists.
The irregular strategist cannot afford to become overly fond of one military tactic,
regardless of evidence suggesting that it has become counter-productive. It is impor-
tant to note that the theory of war and strategy presented by Clausewitz in On War
(see Chapter 2) applies to both sides in irregular warfare. Mao was an admirer of
Clausewitz (Mao, 1961: 49). Regular and irregular warfare differ only in tactical
character. Because both are categories of a common activity, warfare, and both require
direction by strategy, they share the need to be obedient to the general lore of war and
strategy.
Irregular warfare in the forms of guerrilla operations or terrorism (or both) is the
forced choice of the weaker side. As a preference, guerrillas and terrorists would rather
fight in a regular army, engage in decisive manoeuvre and seek swift battlefield victory.
Guerrilla warfare and terrorism are instruments of protracted war, as Mao emphasized
explicitly. He delivered a series of lectures in May and June 1938 collectively titled ‘On
Protracted War’ (Mao, 1963: 187–266). In them he explained why the war against the
Japanese invader had to have a protracted character if it were to be waged successfully.
Strategic effect and political effect accumulate only slowly as a result of the generally
small-scale actions in irregular warfare. The conduct of protracted warfare requires
patience, a high measure of discipline and therefore leadership of outstanding quality.
Irregular fighters face a life of great hardship and need to be able to sustain faith in their
cause, even when victory is nowhere in sight. It follows that morale is of the utmost
importance, a condition shared by regular and irregular combatants.
It is rare for an irregular campaign alone to suffice to bring victory. At some point the
irregular side needs to shift combat mode from guerrilla to regular warfare in pursuit of
a definitive strategic and political success.
The skilful insurgent will conduct guerrilla and regular operations simultaneously,
or at least will threaten convincingly to do so. From Spain and Portugal in 1808–14 to
Indo-China from 1945 to 1975 (with a pause from 1954 to 1960), the story is much the
same. If an irregular force can pose both a dispersed guerrilla menace and a threat of
concentrated military power, or if its operations are coordinated with those of friendly
regular forces, the regular army of the enemy is caught on the horns of an operational
dilemma. If the regular enemy masses troops to meet the regular style of threat, it must
leave most of the civilian population unprotected. But if it disperses troops in order to
Irregular warfare 251