other cultures. It is true to claim that its objectives are so radical as to be non-negotiable,
but it is incorrect to argue that it has no real political agenda. Led by the charismatic
Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda demands the removal of allegedly apostate Islamic regimes;
the restoration of the Caliphate as the source of supreme Islamic authority over the whole
of the Dar ul Islam (it was abolished by Kemal Atatürk in 1924 as a necessary step in his
creation of a modern, secular Turkey); and the elimination of Western non-, even anti-,
Islamic influence and practices from the Middle East. As said, in practice these demands
are thoroughly non-negotiable. Indeed, they are too general in character to serve even
as a basis for negotiation. In other words, even if al Qaeda’s enemies would like to seek
a compromise settlement, the movement’s ideologically driven agenda is not of a kind
that lends itself to a process of give and take. Unlike Irish or Palestinian terrorist organi-
zations, al Qaeda, claiming religious sanction for its absolute demands, cannot be bribed
to the conference table and offered some fraction of its demands.
The New Terrorism is novel in several important respects. As befits a creation of the
Information Age, it is organized as a network, not a hierarchy. It is indifferent to the loss
of human life. Those whom it kills, or murders, as well as those who sacrifice themselves
as its shock troops, serve the will of Allah, consensually or otherwise. And it has the
potential to graduate from terrorism, through guerrilla warfare, to a full-scale insurgency
in especially vulnerable Islamic countries. At present, al Qaeda is not a popular insur-
gency anywhere, but that situation could alter for the worse. The insurgents in Iraq and
Afghanistan have many motives, with al Qaeda’s brand of jihad figuring in them only
modestly. But it is well to recall that before they were forcibly eliminated, al Qaeda’s
training camps, pre-eminently in Taliban Afghanistan, graduated some 30,000–50,000
recruits. They comprise a reserve army of potential jihadists, including suicide bombers.
Today, novice jihadists can receive on-the-job training under fire in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As an irregular menace, al Qaeda’s New Terrorism poses an extraordinary strategic
problem. To cite the leading elements in that challenge from the perspective of CT
endeavours, al Qaeda:
- is culturally very hard to penetrate;
- is experienced in the conduct of irregular warfare;
- enjoys the prestige that flows from a tradition of victory;
- is ever changing in its organization and methods – it is a highly adaptive movement,
perhaps not really an organization at all, but rather both an inspiration and a source
of practical advice and support to disparate groups; - seeks to punish, inflict pain and wreak destruction, all sanctioned by the will of God,
as interpreted; - favours the employment of suicide bombers, a tactic that renders the CT task
unusually difficult – the greatest challenge to the would-be terrorist has always
previously been the problem of escaping safely after an outrage is committed.
In due course, al Qaeda will decline and fall, but already it has demonstrated the ability
to conduct irregular warfare so successfully that it has all but transformed the character
of contemporary international politics, and it is unquestionably the defining threat of this
era. Before al Qaeda and its imitators and successors fade away, they have the potential
to wreak immeasurable harm in the world of Islam and, as a direct consequence, upon
260 War, peace and international relations