the global economy through the agencies of oil supply and general economic confidence.
In addition, there is a real possibility, even a probability, that the New Terrorism will
acquire some weapons of mass destruction. In sharp contrast to nuclear-armed states, a
nuclear-armed al Qaeda could not be deterred, even in theory (Allison, 2004).
Conclusion
There are two principal reasons why a healthy future can be predicted for irregular
warfare. The first is uncontentious; the second is controversial. First, there will always be
conflicts, primarily domestic, wherein the belligerents are grossly asymmetrical accord-
ing to standard measurements of military power. In those contests the much weaker side
is able to survive strategically only by behaving as a terrorist, guerrilla or insurgent.
Open, regular warfare would be suicidal. The second reason why irregular warfare
currently is on a rising curve of popularity is the alleged decline in the authority of the
state under the pressures of globalization. Rephrased, it is claimed that the state is less
powerful than it used to be. This condition serves as an invitation to armed insurrection
by groups that sense a historic opportunity to shoot their way to a local victory for their
dreams, ambitions and interests. There is little doubt that the processes of globalization
have weakened the ability of most states to serve the vital interests of their citizens
unilaterally. But whether this relative decline is of a significance great enough to tempt
dissidents to resort to organized violence is debatable.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century the United States has declared that it is
a ‘nation at war’. But commitment to irregular warfare with a global domain against
Islamic jihadists is not a strategically promising undertaking. The reasons lie in those
contexts identified as vital back in Chapter 1. Of the seven contexts identified (political;
socio-cultural; economic; technological; military-strategic; geographical; and historical),
at least three intrude upon, even dominate, the West’s struggle against Islamic irregulars.
Specifically, Islamic terrorists and insurgents cannot be defeated by military means, and
especially not by non-Islamic arms. The irregular campaign advertised so dramatically
on 9/11 will be defeated, which is to say contained and slowly reduced to irrelevance,
only as a consequence of effective measures taken by Islamic governments and societies.
The Islamic world needs to reform itself, cope better with the problem of gross mald-
istribution of wealth, and come to grips with the need to accommodate a proper respect
for religion within a modernizing society. If that formidable agenda were addressed fairly
successfully, the political fuel for al Qaeda and other violent groups and movements
would diminish markedly.
Irregular warfare has been discussed separately in this chapter strictly as a matter of
convenience. Because the strategic history of the past 200 years has been driven forward
overwhelmingly by interstate conflict, this book is obliged to reflect that fact. However,
warfare as conducted by irregulars has been an ever-present strategic reality. It featured
especially in resistance to the growth of European empires, and then in efforts to speed
their decline and collapse. Irregular warfare is not owned by any particular creed or
interest but is simply a tool kit of military techniques to which the materially inferior side
must resort if it wishes to take up arms.
The fact that irregular warfare is treated separately here implies nothing about its
nature and functioning. It has not competed hard for space in previous chapters because
Irregular warfare 261