had their origins, though not always their profoundest roots, in the interwar periods from
which they emerged. Efforts to establish and sustain a stable international order and the
fate of those endeavours are integral to strategic history. Chapter after chapter has had
much to say about the pre- and post-war contexts of conflicts. Not until the nuclear
revolution radically altered the cost–benefit ratio of warfare were peace and order
synonymous. The great general wars of 1792–1815, 1914–18 and 1939–45 were all
waged by one side, at least, with the restoration of a stable and tolerable international
order as the principal motive. Order and war have not only been compatible; sometimes
the former has been judged widely to require the latter.
What is the meaning of the obviously important, but somewhat opaque, concept of
international, even world, order? It can be understood to refer to a stable pattern in the
relations among states, with that pattern expressing interests, values and norms that the
major states find acceptable. One could tinker with the definition for a better historical
fit with particular periods, but the bare definition just offered holds no less for the 2000s
than it did for the 1820s or 1920s. International order has to be understood in three ways.
First, it is simply descriptive: what is, or was, the international order? Second, it is a
normative concept: what should it be? Third, it can be employed prescriptively: how
might it be improved?
With just a single exception, after every great war in modern history there has been a
conscious effort to construct a world order that should be an improvement upon that
which preceded the period of conflict. Those construction efforts always involved
institution-building. Their successes and failures, time after time, depended upon the
same factors. An international order is relatively stable when its rules, norms, and
distribution of rights and duties are broadly in accord with the interests and values of the
major state, and other essential, players. Not until the 1990s was the structure of world
order in modern history dominated by a single state, the American superpower. From the
1790s until the 1980s the architecture of world order was either multipolar, typically with
five great powers of variable strength, or briefly bipolar, as from 1945 to 1989. The 1990s
were also historically unique in the period covered by this analysis in that they were
the only post-war–interwar period that did not witness a purposeful effort to construct a
new world order. One can speculate as to why that was the case, and focus upon lack of
political vision and leadership, but it is probably more plausible to suggest that the
unusual and unexpected manner of the termination of the Cold War was the principal
element shaping the post-war environment. The Cold War did not conclude officially, any
more than it had begun officially. There could be no peace treaty, and as a result there
was no conference to debate the issues of the era. In the 1990s there was no replay of
Vienna in 1814–15, or Versailles in 1919 or even Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.
Before providing a summary of the historical record of ordering efforts from the 1810s
until today, it is necessary to emphasize the nature of the subject at issue. Order does not
necessarily mean peace, at least not directly. International or world order, understood
normatively rather than just descriptively, can be said to be in place and functioning well
enough when the essential state and any other players are able to pursue and protect their
interests in ways and to a degree that all, or most, find acceptable. Power is balanced,
albeit only approximately. Should a state or coalition threaten to destabilize the
international order, then sooner or later the other great powers in the system would
combine to contain, and if need be materially reduce, it by force. World order is about
266 War, peace and international relations