distributed geopolitically in the worst possible way for the security of Britain and its
empire. Germany in Northern Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean on the main route
to the Middle East and India, and Japan in the Far East equalled at least one enemy
too many for Britain. And in the 1930s, France increasingly took its lead in foreign
policy from Britain.The 1930s was a decade separated from its predecessor politically, economically,
socio-culturally and strategically by the consequences of the Great Depression. The
history of the 1930s demonstrates what can happen when an international order, in this
case that established by the Versailles Settlement, lacks a policeman. Someone or
something has to keep the peace. The duty includes a necessary readiness to wage some
warfare soon, lest a great deal more warfare might need to be waged later. In the 1930s,
international order was at the mercy of the most unscrupulous and ambitious states.
The issue of interest for this analysis is not international misbehaviour, but rather the
historically attested importance of the need for the protection of order. It cannot be
assumed that by some hidden hand of political and strategic necessity, aggressive
revolutionary powers somehow will be deterred, and if need be defeated. Wars, great and
small, regular and irregular, occur despite the presence of a willing and fairly able
protecting agent, but at least the reality of such a policeman affords some prospect of a
stable international, and domestic, order. The League of Nations failed in its primary
mission, which was to prevent the recurrence of the Great War of 1914–18. In the 1930s
there was no one willing or able, singly or in combination with others, to act forcibly to
protect the international order. As a consequence of this failure, 53 million people died,
more than 36 million of them civilians.
The Cold War order and the United Nations
The new world order envisaged by optimist-idealists in 1945 had as its centre of gravity
the invention of the United Nations. It was created in wartime at a conference in San
Francisco, and its permanent home was to be in New York City. President Roosevelt was
determined to lock his country into a leading role in the UN, and by housing the
organization in America he believed he could prevent much of the kind of domestic
opposition that had thwarted Woodrow Wilson over US participation in the League. The
UN was not wholly the product of optimist-idealists, though. Pessimist-realists made
some useful contributions, too. Most notably, the UN, in common with its League
predecessor, was to have what amounted to an executive committee in the form of the
Security Council. The core of the Council would comprise five permanent members
(the P5), each of which enjoyed a right of veto over all Security Council decisions. The
veto has turned out to be a blessing for world peace, which was a virtue of no small
importance during the Cold War. It meant that the Security Council could not achieve the
unanimity necessary for action to be recommended or ordered, but, crucially, it also
meant that the super- and great powers would not fight each other as a result of an
ill-judged majority vote in the Security Council.
In practice, the UN performed a worthwhile function during the Cold War decades as
a stage upon which otherwise unheard voices could assert their existence. In addition, it
did useful work in such essentially non-political fields as health and disease, education,
War, peace and international order 271