20 Conclusion
Must future strategic history
resemble the past?Because this is a strategic history, its dominant narrative comprises the consequences
of the threat and use of politically motivated, organized force upon the course of events.
Of course, there is more to history than its strategic dimension alone, and there is more
to strategy than its military component. However, the assumption upon which this text
is founded is only that the strategic thread is the most significant of the several engines
of historical change, not that it is the sole driver. It is true that unmodified reference to
strategy obscures the issue of whether one refers to grand strategy – that is, the purpose-
ful employment of all of a state’s or other political entity’s assets – or only to military
strategy.
Unless otherwise indicated, the abundant references to strategy in this book refer to
military strategy. There are two reasons for this. First, the master narrative, the plot line,
is about the role and consequences of force. Second, if military strategy is allowed to
merge into grand strategy, the logic and perspective of strategic history can be lost, or at
least weakened. The unique perspective that a (military) strategic historical narrative and
analysis can provide would all but disappear. Grand-strategic history is unquestionably
indistinguishable from history. Similarly, grand strategy is synonymous with the old-
fashioned but still useful term ‘statecraft’.
Just four broad claims conclude this discourse. Although this introduction to strategic
history has conclusions, strategic history itself does not.
- Great wars of industrial mobilization, such as World War II, cannot occur any more.
They have been banished by two technological developments: nuclear weapons and
information technology. - The strategic thread in history has fluctuated in importance, but it always returns to
pole position and, overall, it has lost none of its relative significance. Two hundred
years of history show repeatedly both evolutionary and revolutionary changes in
warfare. The military-strategic context has been constantly in motion. Sometimes
movement has been slow, while at other times – from 1916 to 1918, for example –
it has proceeded at almost breakneck speed under the pressure of real-time necessity.