war, and then more war, in pursuit of personal glory, family advancement (Napoleon was
a good Corsican-Italian), loot and simply for its own sake. Sadly for him, his many
victories, no matter how brilliantly obtained, were irrelevant: they would always be
succeeded by the need to fight yet more battles. No matter how competently he waged
war, eventually time, fortune, friction and a bevy of vengeful foes would call him to a
terminal account. And they did, between 1 8 12 and 1 8 15.
The strategic historian must conclude that the wars of the French Revolution and
Napoleon were conducted, after 1794 on the French part, for reasons that defied strategic
logic. Regardless of the quantity and quality of French military means, which were
genuinely formidable for a long period, they could never suffice to meet the unbounded
policy ambitions of their political master. This was a crime against the logic of both
policy and strategy.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed and analysed the transformation of war that was enabled by
the new patriotism triggered by the ideals and the chauvinism of the French Revolution,
a transformation subsequently exploited and perfected by Napoleon. Particular empha-
sis has been laid upon the critical role of the changing political and social contexts,
while the many continuities in military affairs from the eighteenth century through the
two decades of upheaval which concluded at Waterloo in 1 8 15 have also been noted.
Although one may choose to criticize Napoleon for his inability to employ force to secure
a lasting peace, one must give him due credit for his undoubted operational genius and
extraordinary leadership skills. To describe Napoleon is virtually to define charisma.
Above all else, though, this analysis placed the Emperor in the spotlight of Clause-
witzian theory and found him wanting. The Napoleonic Wars stand in sharp contrast to
the situation that was to obtain in World War II, wherein the Allies would not negotiate
with a German government led by Adolf Hitler, if indeed they would negotiate with any
German government at all. Not until 1 8 14 was regime change in Paris an allied demand.
The Emperor passed up many opportunities to negotiate a general settlement that would
be to the French advantage. Yet he also declined to accept any lasting diplomatic
limitation upon his ambition. The distinctive perspective of this book, which is to say
strategic history, focuses attention upon the consequences, or lack thereof, of military
action. One might venture to dissent from Clausewitz with the belief that if Napoleon
was the god of war, he seems to have lost the plot early in his career and confused war
with warfare. Napoleon was so overfond of warfare that he forgot, if he ever knew, that
warfare serves war, which must serve attainable policy goals. But for policy, war and
warfare all to be singing from the same hymn sheet, there has to be a well-wrought and
adaptable strategy. Analyses which make claims for the Emperor’s alleged strategic
genius should be laughed out of court.
48 War, peace and international relations