The Industrial Revolution, therefore, was one in a short series of mighty upheavals
that shaped and reshaped modern strategic history. It could not be evaded or ignored,
any more than could any of its five historical siblings. Each of these great revolutionary
developments had the potential, indeed were certain, to remake the character of war. Time
after time, however, responsible officials, both civil and military, had to recognize the fact
of incipient revolution; then understand its implications; and finally come up with
practical solutions to the political, strategic and military problems and opportunities
created by the radical changes.
The Industrial Revolution which began in Britain in the late eighteenth century spread
inevitably, though at varying speeds, to countries on the continent of Europe and to North
America. It changed almost everything about war and warfare, except for the nature of
those phenomena and possibly the ‘principles’ that Jomini discovered and expounded in
the 1 8 30s (Jomini, 1992). Strictly speaking, the authority of Clausewitz’s theory of war
is immune to the charge of an obsolescence born of cumulatively massive alterations in
technological, political or socio-cultural contexts. Wisely, he crafted his general theory
of war so that it would not need amendment in order to accommodate technical, or any
other, developments. But one must point out that all works of strategic theory, even the
greatest, are the product, and have to reflect the worldview, of a particularly encultured
person located historically at a specific time and place. It is a tribute to the extraordinary
quality of Clausewitz’s theory that his book, inspired above all else by the experience of
the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, has retained an undiminished relevance
throughout the two centuries that are the concern of this text. One must add, however,
that many of his readers, or more often skimmers and quotation-extractors from bowd-
lerized versions of the work, found the Clausewitz that they favoured in his sometimes
apparently contradictory text.
If one fast-forwards to 1914–1 8 , it is abundantly plain that that Great War had a
character, and indeed strictly was enabled, only by the consequences of the French and
Industrial revolutions. This is not to suggest that World War I was caused in some
56 War, peace and international relations
and, if possible, tamed and exploited for national and international security.
The ‘bomb’ was here to stay. It could not be disinvented.- The Information Revolution of the 1980s to the present. Again, this revolution
is more of a process than an event or episode. Also, it had a host of scientific
and technical antecedents. The 19 8 0s are chosen for convenience and strategic
plausibility, as well as because they marked some dramatic changes. This latest
promoter of military revolution has in common with all the rest the defining
feature that it is unavoidable.
One may need to add a seventh entry to this list of MRs.- The Cultural Revolution under way in the Islamic world. This revolution in the
strategic implications of faith exploits industrial and information technology,
and may find employment for the products of the nuclear revolution, but it is
occurring independent of technology. The dominant character of contem-
porary warfare is highly irregular, and therefore asymmetrical.