The modernization of the soldier’s premier weapon between the 1 8 40s and 1914, as
outlined in Box 5.1, was an evolutionary triumph for science, technology, engineering,
industry and military adaptability. However, it was bad news for the would-be warriors
of all countries who would be using and facing these radically new products of the
Industrial and Scientific revolutions in battle. Also, it was far from clear, even to the finest
of contemporary military minds, what the transformation of infantry firepower meant for
logistics, organization, doctrine, tactics, operations, strategy and even high policy (not
that the final item generally was considered a proper military concern).
It is necessary now to devote some time to the weapons that were to dominate the
battlefields of 1914–1 8 : the machine-gun and artillery. Ironically, perhaps, despite the
emphasis here that is required by the history of military advances in the nineteenth
century, the Great War at the close of this period did not showcase the benefits conferred
by the perfection of the infantry rifle. Instead, World War I was to be an artillery war
above all else, while the machine-gun proved to be king of the killing ground of no man’s
land that separated the entrenched, and eventually somewhat pill-boxed, rival armies. In
fact, during the middle years of the war the rifle was seriously demoted in significance
and employment. It was found to be an inappropriate weapon for trench-to-trench combat
and was largely displaced by grenade-throwers, mortars, an imaginative array of blunt
and spiked clubs and an ever-more ubiquitous supply of automatic and semi-automatic
guns.
The first truly practical machine-gun was invented in 1 88 4 by the American Hiram
Maxim. Relying on its own recoil energy, a single water-cooled barrel could fire up to
600 rounds a minute. It was prone to jam, among other technical difficulties, and it used
belt-fed ammunition at a rate that frightened logistical minds. However, it could only
66 War, peace and international relations
was a step-level jump in infantry lethality for the British, French and Union
and Confederate armies.- The near perfection of breech-loading rifles, as achieved by the French with
their class-leading Chassepot (late 1 8 60s). The Chassepot had longer range
(sighted up to 1,600 yards), was more accurate and therefore more lethal than
the 1 8 40s technology with which Prussia’s army was still equipped in 1 8 70,
the Dreyse needle gun, the world’s first successful breech-loader. - The introduction of repeating, and then magazine-fed, rifles(1 8 60s– 8 0s). The
Prussian Dreyse needle gun, the minié rifle and the Chassepot were all single-
shot weapons. Magazine loading greatly speeded the rate of fire. - The invention of smokeless powderin 1 88 4 to replace the black gunpowder,
whose cartridges needed to be bitten off to be released for business, even in
the minié system. Metal (brass) cartridges containing poudre blanc (1 88 4),
ballistite (1 888 ) and cordite (1 88 9) allowed for a smaller calibre (one-third to
a half reduction), which enabled the introduction of clip-feed magazine
loading. That development all but ended the previous blight of the powder
fouling of barrels, and increased range and muzzle velocity. The new ‘white
powder’ propellants on average were three times as powerful as the traditional
black powder they replaced.