The Vienna Settlement of 1 8 14–15, and its evolution from Congress diplomacy to
occasionally effective concerted behaviour, endured for several reasons. It was moderate
in its terms and not drafted to demote France from the club of great powers, only to
remove the possibility of its returning to trouble Europe as an aggressive superpower.
France itself did not harbour strongly revisionist intentions. It had a new royal govern-
ment that was regarded as legitimate by the other great powers. Moreover, for the next
thirty-plus years France was more troubled by threats of a return of domestic revolution
than it was moved to stage a replay of its erstwhile military rampage. A French overseas
military adventure in Algeria was launched in 1 8 30, nominally to suppress the Barbary
pirates. But really it was all about refocusing disturbing domestic dreams of Napoleonic-
style glory into a harmless channel. Also, one should not forget that there was a general
desire among the great powers to maintain the status quo in most countries. Britain and
Russia were respectively the maritime and continental superstates of the era. Prussia was
the weakest club member of the Concert, while Austria was slipping because of its
growing ethnic, cultural and consequentially political tensions. So, any great power
motivation to change the status quo unilaterally foundered on the fear of revolution and
frank recognition that it would lack the strength to impose its will.
Great power relations worked by different norms in the middle two decades of
the century. In France, Napoleon III needed victories in war in order to legitimize his
glittering, but somewhat counterfeit, empire. This was the fundamental reason behind
the Crimean War, the war with Austria in 1 8 59, a Mexican escapade in the 1 8 60s
and even the fatal war with Prussia in 1 8 70. Prussia, with a much improved military
machine by 1 8 66, needed war in order to impose its hegemony upon the whole of
Germany. That purpose required the forcible political expulsion of Austria, the erstwhile
leading German state. To consolidate Prussia’s grip upon a still disunited Germany,
war with France provided the perfect fuel for an all-German patriotism keyed to
Prussian leadership. Needless to say, these violent episodes of disturbance by France
and Prussia were distinctly unconcerted in the great power club. In the Prussian cases,
at least, they were wholly unilateral in action, and were motivated by the no less
unilateral intention of gain at the expense of another great power member of the Concert
club.
The Industrial Revolution was offering professional soldiers ever more lethal weapons
in potentially ever larger quantities, as well as the wonders of long-term food preservation
in tin cans, railways, electric telegraphic, then telephonic, then radio communications,
and eventually the internal combustion engine. But the underlying international political
stability of Europe was transformed very much for the worse by German unification. The
new German Empire was forged by the sword in two semi-dazzling campaigns controlled
by Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder). Moltke’s contemporary international reputation was
challenged only distantly by that of General Robert E. Lee, despite the latter’s ultimate
failure. The German wars all but exploded the character of great power international
relations as they had generally, though far from universally, been practised since the
Vienna Settlement. If the Concert System was not dead after 1 8 71, assuredly it was
on life support in intensive care. Prussia had demonstrated by its military deeds how
much it cared for concerting its behaviour, for not upsetting the established order by
disadvantaging other great powers, as well as for most of the other norms of the club. But
while it was in the safe hands of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany after 1 8 71 was
Nineteenth century: technology and war 71